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Preface 
I wish you to consider the advisability of recommending to the President an 
announcement by him, in which he might be joined by both Churchill and Stalin, to 
the effect that the three Allied Governments would act as trustees to insure that 
Greece as well as the other nations of the Balkans would have the opportunity to 
express, as free citizens, the kind of Government they desire to have.1 
American Intelligence Officer, William J. Donovan to Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt’s 
most trusted advisor, on December 12th, 1944. 
 
Thus, Germans who take part in wholesale shooting of Italian officers or in the 
execution of French, Dutch, Belgian, or Norwegian hostages or of Cretan peasants, 
or who have shared in slaughters on the people of Poland or in territories of the 
Soviet Union which are now being swept clear of the enemy, will know they will be 
brought back to the scene of their crimes and judged on the spot by the peoples 
whom they have outraged. Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with 
innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the 
three Allied Powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth and will 
deliver  them to their accusers in order that justice may be done. 
Statement issued by Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin, 
concerning wartime atrocities, 1 November 1943.2 
 
On October 28th, 1944, two presidents had a secret meeting at a Chicago train station. United 
States President Franklin D. Roosevelt was to meet with Charles Rozmarek, president of the 
newly founded Polish-American Congress. The Congress tried to unite Polish Americans and 
to pursue a common political goal: safeguarding Poland’s future when World War II was to 
end. FDR was on national campaign to search for votes in the upcoming presidential elections 
and hoped to influence the American Pole to let his community support the New Yorker and 
his war time efforts. Earlier in the White House, as Rozmarek recounts to Arthur Bliss Lane, 
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Roosevelt had warned him ‘Stalin had fooled him [Roosevelt] twice and might possibly fool 
him again.’ In that meeting in Chicago, Roosevelt’s fears seem to have come true. 
President Roosevelt in his talk with me expressed distrust of Stalin, having been 
fooled by him, as he stated, on a number of occasions. He plainly indicated that he 
was fearful that Stalin might again collaborate with Hitler as he did in the initial stages 
of the war and the president wanted at all costs to prevent such an alliance. He kept on 
repeating to me: ‘Let us win the war with Germany first.’ The president let it be 
understood that once Hitler was defeated, he would know how to handle Stalin.3 
Roosevelt was not given the chance, however. He died early in 1945, before Hitler was 
defeated. Stalin and FDR’s successor, Harry Truman, were to escalate the conflicts between 
the United Nations and Russia and began a cold war. 
The Grand Alliance of Great Britain, the United States and the U.S.S.R. in World War II at 
first seems to be a story of heroics. In 1940, it was very unlikely that Great Britain would ever 
emerge victorious from the battlefields of World War II. The German armies had overrun 
Poland, the Low Countries, France and many other countries in lightning speed, taking away 
many allies of the old British Empire. The invasion of the British Islands itself was at hand. 
The United States, on their part, did not want to participate in the war, while Soviet Russia 
made a non-aggression pact with Hitler. Great Britain in 1940, in other words, stood alone. In 
1945, however, British troops marched to Berlin, alongside their American allies. Eventually, 
the Soviet Red Army captured the German capital. In five years time, formal relations 
between Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union had changed completely. The 
world had seen the rise of a highly successful, yet unlikely, military alliance. Many, however, 
tend to argue differently from this story of success. Both present-day historians and 
eyewitnesses account for the difficulties between the Big Three. A British interpreter at the 
Tehran Conference, for example, mentions that Stalin’s barbarous ideas were in contrast with 
the humanity of the American President and the British Prime Minister. ‘The establishment of 
justice and human rights’ was on the top of these two men’s agendas. None of this was to be 
found with Joseph Stalin, according to the interpreter.4 
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When I set out researching, I was very intrigued with this subject. The difficulties between 
Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt and Joseph Stalin, that is what I originally wanted to 
research. Their diplomatic struggle may be hard to understand, yet they make a compelling 
story. As I made my way in much archival material, diplomatic correspondence, internal 
memoranda and the like, I began to realize, though, that this story has been told many times 
before. One can question therefore, from what new point of view this research will look at the 
relationship between the Big Three. While visiting The Hague, however, I found something of 
interest. On April 12th, 1943, the Germans announced on the national radio that mass graves 
were found in the forest of Katyn, near Smolensk in Western Russia. These graves were said 
to contain over 10,000 bodies of Polish officers, who had been brutally executed with a 
gunshot in the back of their heads. The Germans claimed those officers had surrendered 
themselves to the Red Army after the German-Soviet invasion of Poland in 1939 and were 
taken to Soviet labor camps as prisoners of war. In short, this was to be evident proof that the 
Soviet Union had committed a most terrible war crime. I was not so much intrigued with the 
crime itself or the immediate discussion afterwards whether it was just German propaganda or 
the Soviets were indeed responsible.5 It was the opinion of modern day historians on British 
and American diplomacy which mainly caught my eyes. Indeed, I found out that many years 
after the discovery of Katyn, it still remains one of the most important and sensitive topics in 
Polish historiography. In 2007, for example, Polish director Andrzej Wajda made a most 
chilling and impressive movie, Katyn, on this subject. Of course, early in 2010, a Tupolev Tu-
154M containing the Polish government, heading for Russia to commemorate the victims of 
Katyn, crashed. The Soviet atrocity was and still is a major issue in Poland and one could read 
this in the historiography. 
In dealing with World War diplomacy, one inevitably has to build on work done by former 
historians. The historiography used in this essay can be divided in two global ways. To start, 
there is a vast majority of literature which argues that Stalin’s demands were astounding and 
impossible to fulfill at the time. The memoirs and biographies from wartime politicians such 
as Winston Churchill, Anthony Eden, Alexander Cadogan, Cordell Hull, Sumner Welles and 
many others are the most important source of material for this school of historians. They cite, 
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for example, how Stalin asked 25 to 30 divisions of British troops to be sent in defense of the 
Soviet Union. Not only would this mean that Great Britain would dispatch its entire army, the 
massive operation of transport would have to happen through the Iranian railroad. This proved 
impossible, notably because the railroad was not even finished at the time. Stalin also claimed 
that Great Britain could easily launch an amphibious assault on France since almost no 
German troops could be found there, as they were all engaged in battle in the Soviet Union.  
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, appeared another historiographical view. Glasnost 
and the opening of Soviet archives proved to these academicians that Western historiography 
could not be further away from the truth. Gorodetsky, for example, explicitly argues that the 
traditional Western view of Stalin placing ‘aggressive and senseless demands’ was ‘simply an 
attempt to project the political reality in Europe after the war back onto the entirely different 
conditions that prevailed at its outset.’6 As the Cold War came to an end, and its rhetoric 
ceased to influence historiography, the way was eventually paved for a more critical view of 
Allied diplomatic relations. Not only Stalin’s actions were now being researched. Instead, 
how British and American politicians dealt with their Soviet allies became a subject of its 
own. Ostrovsky, for example, argues how reluctant the American government was to support 
the Polish community. Roosevelt, in his opinion, did everything he could to avoid British-
Soviet problems and to put aside the ‘Polish Question’ itself. Due to the terrifying power the 
Polish-American community could pose to the President, especially during elections, 
Roosevelt was most reluctant to lend his support to either the Poles or the Russians.7 Filitov 
argues that Western historians have overlooked important parts in their own diplomatic 
history. He points to institutions, such as American State Department, the English Foreign 
Office or the Chiefs of Staff, and how much people within these institutions can debate 
diplomatic questions. Indeed, ‘by identifying specific attitudes and approaches with certain 
official bodies, Western studies have overlooked the undercurrents within each institution as 
well as its changing influence over time.’8 
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To these historians, Sir Stafford Cripps was one of the most important examples of a long 
unknown undercurrent within the British government. Cripps, the British ambassador to the 
Soviet Union from 1940 to 1942, was originally sent by Churchill for his renowned Marxism. 
Churchill in this way hoped that Cripps could gain access to the Soviet top more easily and 
ease British-Soviet relations. Cripps, however, did more than that: he sided with the Soviet 
Union and its demands. The ambassador understood early on how important it was to 
establish full military co-operation between Churchill and Stalin. To do this, Cripps knew he 
had to recognize the Soviet annexations in the Baltic. So, he tried to argue his case to 
Churchill and Eden, saying that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact was a defensive measure 
‘indispensable for the security of the Soviet Union as a result of the failure to provide proper 
diplomatic guarantees in the 1930’s.’9 Cripps’ arguments, however, were never heard. In a 
telegram to the Foreign Office on November 15th, 1941, therefore, he claimed that ‘it appears 
that we are treating the Soviet Government without trust and as inferiors rather than as trusted 
allies.’ Churchill was furious when he read the telegram. The Atlantic Charter and American 
requests not to enter talks with the Soviet Union on frontiers or the post-war world made 
discussion impossible and Churchill discarded the comments of his ambassador.10 
Not only were the British and American governments internally divided, some historians, 
such as Harrison, argue that the British Foreign Office was ‘willing to sacrifice the territorial 
rights of a junior ally’. In his opinion, already in October, 1939, the British Foreign Secretary 
had no problems with the Soviet invasion in Poland. Had the Russians not advanced to a 
boundary that was proposed by a Briton only 20 years before?11 Some historians of Polish 
history tend to share in this view. In their opinion, the Western democracies are to blame for 
the atrocities and tragedy that occurred in Poland both during and after the war. Not only did 
they not prevent it, they actually allowed it to happen. As shall be seen in the following 
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chapter, a diplomatic crisis such as Katyn is nowadays argued to be a ‘triumph of Allied self-
interest and realist statecraft over abstract truth.’12 In the opinion of these historians, that was 
the risk of waging such a massive war. ‘If smaller Allies would suffer, that was to be the price 
of waging a global struggle.’13  
This historiographical interest in the Anglo-Americans from the late 1980s onwards, then, can 
be divided in three further ways or, as I call them here, schools. First, there is a school of 
innocence. These historians argue that people such as Churchill, Eden and Roosevelt had the 
best of intentions, but were simply outwitted. They tried whatever they could, yet, in the end 
Stalin was much more powerful. Raack, for example, argues that the leaders of the West 
could not have known of secret territorial agreements between Stalin and his pseudo-Polish 
government in Moscow. Britain and the United States could also hardly have known the full 
extent of how thousands of Poles were sent to camps or were moved to countries such as 
Kazakhstan.14 This first school is closely related to the view before the 1970s and continues to 
use its main arguments. To these historians, it is clear that Stalin still played a central role. He 
undermined the war time alliance and eventually played an important part in starting the Cold 
War. Even after investigating Roosevelt and Churchill’s dealings with the Soviet Union, one 
could not conclude anything other than that. 
Lukas and Mayers are but two examples of the school of blame. This school rediscovered 
critical comments of, sometimes within, the Anglo-American governments during World War 
II and used them in their arguments. According to these historians, Great Britain and the 
United States were not outwitted by Stalin. Instead, they were fully aware of what the Soviet 
leader wanted, namely conquering Poland, and did not do enough to prevent that. Churchill 
and Roosevelt tried to keep Stalin on board at any cost, while chasing their own political 
agendas. In the opinion of these historians, Poland was a victim of that. Mayers, for example, 
tries to show how the Allied war effort was designed to please the Soviets. Through Lend 
Lease, convoys and a strong insistence on Germany’s unconditional surrender, Stalin was to 
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be kept away from any idea of making a separate treaty with Hitler once again. Poland’s 
future was of no concern to them. Polish grievances were ‘not considered in Linden or 
Washington to be worth jeopardizing the Anglo-US war time alliance with Russia.’15 Lukas 
argues how Admiral Standley, the U.S. Ambassador in Moscow until 1943, was starting to 
wonder that the Kremlin was using ‘Katyn’ as a way to press American and British agreement 
on Russian territorial claims in Poland. While being aware of this development, Roosevelt 
himself had given the Polish Ambassador in Washington his views on the matter. He simply 
told the diplomat that when Stalin would indeed press for a rectification of Poland’s eastern 
frontier, the United States could not go to war with him over it.16 
Some historians recently tried to fuse this second school of blame with the historiography 
before the 1970s. They carefully argue Stalin’s intentions on the one hand. On the other hand, 
however, in showing the Soviet leader’s plans these academicians try to argue how badly 
Roosevelt and Churchill responded to the Soviet menace. I will name three examples of this 
special category of historians within the school of blame. Firstly, Cienciala argues that Stalin 
was searching deliberately for a diplomatic break with the London Poles. The Soviets had 
already made contact with Polish communists as early as February 1942. They also stated 
officially in January, 1943, that Poles residing east of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Line were 
considered Soviet citizens. And between August and September, 1942, Stalin had used the 
Polish army division within the Soviet Union as diplomatic leverage. By refusing to supply it, 
the Soviet leader hoped to put pressure on Sikorski and his government in London in an 
attempt to settle the question of the Polish borders. The British managed to avert this crisis 
and urged for the reposition of the Polish army to Iran. With Polish officers to remain in 
charge of its army divisions in Iran, Britain and the Soviet Union were now to share its supply 
and armament. Yet, the Anglo-Americans were not seeing the danger that developing and 
how confident Stalin was becoming.17 Secondly, both Sanford and Paul claim that the Nazi 
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announcement of Katyn, a topic discussed in the next chapter, was conveniently timed for 
both Germany and Russia. The announcement of what happened there gave Goebbels the 
opportunity to split the United Nations in a crucial period of the war. The Red Army had 
found its strength again after many defeats and was now counter-attacking German panzers in 
Russia. Also, in April, 1943, the Germans were aiming to divert international attention away 
from their planned liquidation of the Jewish Ghetto in Warsaw. The Polish government-in-
exile wanted to be sure whether Germany’s accusations were right or wrong. As the Poles 
said in a message to the Russians: ‘only irrefutable facts can outweigh the numerous and 
detailed German statements concerning the discovery of the bodies.’18 Stalin seemed all but 
willing to conceal Katyn and use the German announcement to get his way. On April, 21st, 
1943, five days before Stalin would formally end his allegiance to the Polish government-in-
exile, he sent Churchill and Roosevelt the following message: 
The fact that the anti-Soviet campaign had been started simultaneously in the German 
and Polish press and follows identical lines is indubitable evidence of contact and 
collusion between Hitler – the Allies’ enemy – and the Sikorski Government in this 
hostile campaign. At a time when the peoples of the Soviet Union are shedding their 
blood in a grim struggle against Hitler’s Germany and bending their energies to defeat 
the common foe of the freedom-loving democratic countries, the Sikorski government 
is striking a treacherous blow at the Soviet Union to help Hitler’s tyranny. These 
circumstances compel the Soviet government to consider that the present Polish 
government, having descended to collusion with the Hitler government has, in 
practice, severed its relations of alliance with the U.S.S.R. and adopted a hostile 
attitude to the Soviet Union. For these reasons the Soviet Government has decided to 
interrupt relations with that Government.19 
In Paul’s eyes, German propaganda and cunning had given Stalin the accusation he needed to 
break diplomatic relations with the Poles. He argues that the discovery of the Polish mass 
grave was not a surprise to some high-ranking Poles in the government and the army and 
because of this knowledge had been lured into a diplomatic trap. The Poles knew that the 
Russians had deported many of their compatriots as prisoners of war to camps within the 
Soviet Union and the Russians knew the Poles knew. General Anders, the leader of the Polish 
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Army in Iran, had himself been a prisoner in Lubyanka, a camp near Moscow. Reactions from 
the London Poles to the Katyn news were enough for the Soviets to break relations quickly. 
To name an example, General Anders made a speech two days after the Katyn announcement 
to his soldiers. It contained a powerful that the Soviets were all but willing to hear: 
In spite of tremendous efforts on our side we have received absolutely no news of any 
of them. We have long held the deep conviction that none of them are alive but that 
they were deliberately murdered. I consider it necessary for the government to 
intervene in this affair with the object of obtaining official explanations from the 
Soviets, especially as our soldiers are convinced that the rest of our people in the 
U.S.S.R. will also be exterminated.20 
Cienciala, Sanford and Paul are certain. Roosevelt and Churchill were blind to what happened 
and when the truth came out, they did nothing about it. In April, 1943, Stalin effectively 
controlled Polish refugees in the Soviet Union; he was responsible for the supply of the Polish 
military forces in Iran as he had formed a puppet. The London Poles, in their eyes, were 
powerless, while Great Britain and the United States were both speechless and unwilling to 
act. Sanford notes how willing the British and Americans were to cast the actual truth, 
Russia’s involvement in the killings, aside. The Americans, in his opinion, were more 
pragmatic and flexible in handling the difficulties of Katyn than the British with Roosevelt 
suppressing and excluding inconvenient evidence of Soviet guilt.21  
Thirdly and finally, there is a small historical view that tends to look in depth to how the 
British and American governments came to their diplomatic actions. In this school of 
reconstruction, it is thought to be important how politicians and diplomats approached these 
difficult topics as Katyn and the ‘Polish Question’. In Folly’s opinion, ‘exploration must be 
conducted to see what was actually assumed (…), on what evidence and under whose 
influence.’22 No longer should historians think in black and white, and assume that the Soviets 
made far too powerful demands or that the British and Americans saw the war effort as the 
most important goal of them all. Diplomacy posed moral questions on the participants and 
they had to choose, sometimes against their will, between the lesser of two evils. Folly 
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himself studied the opinion of the British Foreign Office in this matter, yet I personally 
believe that such an approach could be feasible in a debate which is clearly influenced by later 
moral opinion. In short, historians need to try to take distance from their own opinion and 
present the facts. This is however easier said than done, given the moral issues Anglo-
Americans found themselves in. 
I found it striking that mainly Polish authors and a few Britons claimed Poland was left to its 
fate by those it regarded as its protectors. The United States and Great Britain, in their 
opinion, did not do anything to save the Polish nation against the dangers of Stalin and his 
communist Red Army. Evidence for this opinion, they claim, could be found anywhere. 
Diaries from important statesmen, for example, literally said why Poland was not to be 
rescued. Everything seemed to point to the betrayal of Poland. The very country for which 
Great Britain went to war in 1939, in the opinion of these authors, was also the country that 
was divided at the Yalta Conference of 1945. 
In this Master-Thesis for the University of Leiden, it would be far too great a challenge to 
face these historians head on and rewrite over 60 years of historiography on Anglo-American 
diplomatic handling of Polish affairs in World War II. However, in my opinion, it would be 
wise to reconstruct the story of diplomacy in this important period of time. Diplomacy, as said 
recently by a Hungarian student, is more difficult than it seems. In his words, ‘diplomacy is to 
say bad things in the nicest way.’ To honor this insight, and to give it more weight, I chose to 
use the metaphor of diplomacy being a chess-game with Britain and the United States on one 
side of the board and Russia sitting on the other. Both sides know their goal, winning the 
chess-game and diplomatically achieve what they wanted, but what really mattered where the 
moves before check-mate could be reached. In that Chicago meeting, Roosevelt seemed to 
think he still had a chance to beat Stalin, that he was only checked. It would be interesting, in 
my opinion, to take a look at those moves which could possibly lead to a check-mate and 
remove a veil of morality, of color, in the historiography that is haunting this topic for so 
long. 
In this Thesis I ask myself the following question: ‘How do historians look at British and 
American handling of the ‘Polish Question’ in World War II, from the moment ‘Katyn’ led to 
a break between the Soviet Union and the Polish government-in-exile in April 1943 tot the 
end of the Warsaw Uprising in September 1944, and in what ways did the United States and 
13 
 
Great Britain want to solve this problem in accordance with the wishes of the Polish 
government-in-exile?’ Of course, this is a vast question and answering the question in definite 
would require a lot more space and argument than I can possibly provide here. Yet, by 
choosing for the ‘chess game’ metaphor, reconstructing Anglo-American diplomacy and 
discussing the historiography on this topic, I hope to add a more moderate view to the debate 
of the Allied intervention in Polish affairs during World War II. 
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Chapter 1: Introducing the game board and the players… 
From the recording of these few facts one may conclude that the restoration of a 
strong, sovereign and independent Poland will not only be an act of historical 
justice but one of peculiar character and weight; corresponding to the peculiar part 
that Poland has had to play in the war and to her large moral and material 
contribution to the struggle – including the blood of her sons. In consequence of all 
this, the nation should belong to the victorious peoples when it is over, not to the 
vanquished; and with all the consequences pertaining to victory. 
Stanislaw Mikolajczyk, the Polish Prime Minister from July 1943 to September 
1944, in The Slavonic and East European Review, issue 23, 1945.23 
 
We may, it seems to me, be faced with a reversal in European history. To protect 
itself from the influences of Bolshevism, Western Europe in 1918 attempted to set up 
a cordon sanitaire. The Kremlin, in order to protect itself from the influences of the 
West, might now envisage the formation of a belt of pro-Soviet states. 
William Harrison Standley, United States ambassador to the Soviet Union from 14 
April 1942 to 19 September 1943, in a cable to the State Department, 1943.24 
 
In the very year World War II was about to end, Polish Prime Minister Stanislaw Mikolajczyk 
made an appeal to the readers of the international academic magazine The Slavonic and East 
European Review.25 In it, he emphasized, for instance, the heroics displayed by the Polish 
citizens during the war and how important Poland really was within the United Nations. 
Mikolajczyk’s message was clearly written out of fear. It is one of many examples of Polish 
historiography on World War II which, in Padraic Kenney’s words ‘has been smacked by a 
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sense of grievance.’26 In 1944, the future of the Prime Minister’s nation was uncertain. 
Indeed, he did not have any idea at all what Poland or even the whole of Europe was going to 
look like after the war.27 Instead of being a seemingly romantic description of Polish heroics 
this article was a desperate plea for survival. Poland, in his opinion, does have a rightful place 
in the new world order after 1945. During World War II, the Eastern European country had 
come to the brink of its destruction once again. 
This first chapter will give a historical background to the events concerning Poland right 
before April 1943. I believe this is necessary for a number of reasons. First, the ‘Polish 
Question’ has shaped Polish history in many ways and therefore such a vast subject requires a 
sufficient explanation. Second, I believe it is very important to give the Poles, represented 
here by its own government-in-exile, a voice of their own in this story. How did they respond 
to the events in World War II? What was their reaction to the ‘Big Three’ (Churchill, 
Roosevelt and Stalin) when they tried to come to an understanding about the future of the 
disputed state? Shortly describing Polish opinions and actions will lend, in my opinion, 
historical justice to those whose future was being decided by powers which they could hardly 
control. A brief introduction to the Poles shall be given. Third, and most importantly in this 
essay, I will introduce Britain and the United States. How did they respond to the Poles and 
Russians, before April, 1943? Fourth, and final, I would like to take a look on the 
historiography on these subjects and how it changed over time. 
In short, this chapter about the ‘Polish Question’ will have a more global, perhaps even 
introductory character than the ones to follow. Yet, the Question itself should not be thought 
lightly. For it was Lord Hastings Ismay, Churchill’s chief military adviser and first Secretary 
General of NATO, who claimed after the war: ‘nobody can deny that the failure to secure 
freedom and independence for Poland has brought shame on the Western Democracies.’28 A 
good introduction in this topic, in my opinion, is invaluable to understanding the difficult 
questions to which the Allies were posed after April, 1943. 
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1.1. Setting up the chess board: the ‘Polish Question’ and its history to 1943. 
Before the outbreak of World War II, the ‘Polish Question’ had already raised difficulties for 
the Polish nation many times before. Indeed, well before Napoleon Bonaparte set out on his 
quest to conquer Europe Polish national borders were disputed. Prussia, Austria-Hungary and 
tsarist Russia all claimed parts of Polish territory. For hundreds of years, Poland was a major 
topic in political agendas. Its borders continuously shifted and, at some in points in history, 
the state even ceased to exist. World War I, however, was to give the Poles the opportunity to 
raise their old country from the grave once again. Poland formally did not exist any more after 
1886. The President of the United States, Woodrow Wilson, was to change this. He was aware 
of the need to redesign Europe after the war had ended. Nations had to be remade and borders 
were to shift in such a way that a future war could be prevented. More importantly, Wilson 
thought it important that no war again should be fought for disputed land. In his opinion, then, 
every ethnicity should have a single undisputed state. Put simply, Germany was to be 
exclusively for Germans, while Czechs were to be given a Czech state and Poles were 
supposed to live in Poland. Indeed, Poland was a special case for Woodrow Wilson. When he 
crafted his famous Fourteen Points, the thirteenth point was exclusively designed for 
recreating that old Eastern European country. The point called for ‘an independent Polish 
State, which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations.’29 Of 
course, this raised Polish expectations for the resurrection of their state, which had lost its 
independency 123 years before.  
Eventually, Polish frontiers were established in June 1919, at the Peace Conference of 
Versailles, and the Republic of Poland was created. However, this international decision 
immediately raised old issues with Poland’s eastern neighbor: the two year old Soviet Union. 
In 1919, the Treaty of Versailles claimed that Poland was to receive all of the territory it had 
possessed before it was partitioned for the first time in 1773. However, due to resettlement 
and colonization, the Polish nation did not mainly consist of Poles anymore. A German 
minority could now be found on the western frontier, especially in the area around the former 
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German port of Danzig. Alongside the eastern frontier now lived Lithuanians, Ukrainians and 
Belorussians. Lenin demanded that these Slav peoples were of old a part of tsarist Russia and, 
therefore, a part of nowadays communist Russia. The ‘Polish Question’, then, did not just 
only consist of the drawing of Poland’s borders. It also questioned whether millions of people 
belonged to one state or the other. As it turned out, Wilson’s original intent of creating a 
Polish state exclusively for Polish ethnicities was very difficult to realize after the end of 
World War I.30 
To solve these problems, the Allied Supreme Council proposed a new demarcation line on the 
eastern border of the new Polish Republic. This was to be the so-called Curzon Line of 
December 8th, 1919, named after its creator, British Foreign Secretary Lord George Curzon. 
The new demarcation line was to divide the areas on the Polish eastern frontier between its 
Polish and non-Polish civilians. In short, the Curzon Line was to separate the Polish Republic 
and the Soviet Union in such a way that it would please both nations and affirmed which 
people belonged to what state. On the one hand, the Curzon Line handed Poland the area of 
Bialystok and the cities of Lwów and Vilna, given the fact they were housing many Poles. 
According to Harrison, the cities of Lwów and Vilna were not just ordinary cities, they were 
very important to the Polish cause. In his opinion, the Poles believed Lwów and Vilna to be 
‘symbols of Poland’s ancient tradition as the leader of Eastern Europe.’ Indeed, ‘without 
them, their country was just another small European state.’31 On the other hand, the Curzon 
Line handed the Soviet Union territories in Belorussia and the Ukraine. In 1919, then, areas 
with a Polish majority were acceded to Poland. The Soviet Union received areas with a Slavic 
majority. 
The new demarcation line, however, seemed to increase the problems, instead of solving 
them. The people from the Ukraine, according to the Curzon Line now becoming Soviet 
citizens, were bitterly divided on whether they wanted to become a part of the Bolshevik 
nation. One part of the Ukrainians sided with the Soviets, while another part opted for Poland 
as their new nation. Poland’s Chief of State, Josef Pilsudski, was not pleased either. He 
thought Poland was weak on the eastern frontier and feared his new nation was eventually to 
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be overrun by German armies on the west and Soviet armies on the east. Opting for a more 
easily defendable eastern frontier and sensing the time right for an invasion on the Soviet 
Union, Pilsudski moved his Polish armies into Belarus and the Ukraine. From 1920 to 1921, 
Poland and the Soviet Union were to fight each other over the question of Polish borders.32 
This sudden war surprised the Soviet Union at first. Yet, Lenin’s forces countered the Polish 
invasion. They marched to the Polish capital of Warsaw and were very close to conquering it. 
This failed however. Within one year after the war began, Polish forces yet again invaded the 
Soviet Union. On March 18th, 1921, the Polish-Soviet War ended with the Treaty of Riga and 
Pilsudski’s efforts to gain Belarus and the Ukraine, in his opinion forming an important part 
within the old borders of the first Polish kingdom in medieval times, partly had an effect. The 
Traktat Ryski divided Belarus and Ukraine in half and effectively moved the Curzon line 
hundreds of miles to the east.33 According to historian George Sanford, the Polish-Soviet war 
had important consequences for the relations between the two countries. Poland was now 
known to the Soviets as paskaia Pol’ska, a gentry-ruled state. It was also responsible for a 
humiliating defeat at the gates of Warsaw. The Red Army had failed the motherland, leaving 
its commanders embittered. One of these commanders, Josef Stalin, was to carry those 
experiences with him for the rest of life and supposedly turned it into a hatred for Poland. 
Indeed, whenever the opportunity for revenge arose, so Sanford argues, the Soviet war 
machine was to strike hard on its Polish enemy.34  
The Soviet Union was not the only nation which had many claims against the new Polish 
Republic after 1919. Germany, especially Hitler when he rose to power in the 1930s, also 
wanted to see their old lands returned. To achieve such a purpose, the Germans made a 
diplomatic move that surprised the whole world. On August 23rd, 1939, the Foreign 
Secretaries of both Germany and the Soviet Union signed a pact of neutrality, the so-called 
Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. If a future war should break out, this document made sure that 
Hitler and Stalin, who were known for not being very good friends, would not attack each 
other and stay out of each others’ affairs. As many did not know at the time, the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Pact also contained several secret agreements which were to shape the events that 
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were about to happen in Poland. On September 1st, 1939, World War II began with the 
German invasion of Poland along its western borders. Two weeks later, on September 17th, 
the Red Army surprised the world with an invasion along Poland’s eastern frontier. As it 
turned out, the Neutrality Pact had divided Poland in half. Hitler’s panzers were to take the 
west-side of Poland, while Stalin was given the east. Earlier Polish border disputes, together 
with strategic reasons, had led Hitler and Stalin to divide Poland among them. Again, a 
demarcation line was drawn. According to Cienciala, this new Molotov-Ribbentrop line of 
1939 had a close resemblance to the 1919 Curzon line. In practice, Stalin was to receive 
everything the Soviet Union had lost in the Treaty in the Riga, bringing Poland’s border back 
to the Curzon Line.35  
As can be seen above, Poland’s borders both have a difficult history as they have been 
disputed many times. However, this ‘Polish Question’ had great consequences for the Polish 
citizenry. George Sanford, for example, argues that the Soviet Union was clear in its 
intentions. The Red Army was not to draw new borders for the Motherland, they were intent 
‘to destroy Polish political, social and cultural influence entirely, and to disperse the Polish 
population throughout the U.S.S.R., where it could be controlled effectively.’36 This was also 
recognized during World War II itself. On May 18th, 1940, for example, the British 
Ambassador to Poland from 1934 to 1941, Sir Howard Kennard, sent the following note to 
Lord Halifax, an important member of the British Foreign Office: 
The policy of deportations is once more being carried out on a large scale. The persons 
arrested largely belong to the intelligentsia and include the wives and families of 
Polish officers who are now abroad. It is further probable that many schoolboys have 
also been arrested. A similar fate hangs over the remaining Poles of the landowning 
class in the northern parts of the Soviet occupation, and it is all the more terrible as 
these survivors are mostly women and children, the menfolk of the family being in the 
main either abroad or in Russian prisons and internment camps.37 
In 1944, in a small article from the United States about Governments in Exile, Daniel Bell 
describes how the Soviets organized plebiscites in its conquered Polish territories on October 
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22nd, 1939. Barely a month after the Red Army invaded them, the Poles were asked whether 
they were to join the Soviet Union. Bell argued that these so-called elections were ‘preceded 
by a reign of terror’ and ‘more than one million Poles – Gentiles and Jews – were deported to 
Siberia and Central Asia.’38 
The Soviet-German invasion of 1939 did not solve the ‘Polish Question’. Germany’s attack 
on the Soviet Union made former border agreements between the two nations something of 
the past. Indeed, the matter was several times very much alive during the rest of World War 
II. Even while Hitler’s Wehrmacht nearly reached the gates of Moscow, Soviet demands of 
Poland’s eastern lands still remained strong. Indeed, after the victories of Stalingrad and 
Kursk in early 1943, these demands seemed to grow even stronger every day. The New York 
Times of November 21st, 1943, stated the following: 
There have been increasing signs lately that when Russian publicists talk about Russia 
they mean all the territory east of the Molotov-Ribbentrop line bisecting Poland. 
Soviet Ambassador Constantine Oumansky [the Soviet Ambassador to Mexico] 
indicated quite clearly in his speech at Mexico City recently that Russia considered 
her legitimate boundary with Poland to be rested on this line, which takes in a 
considerable portion of what was the eastern half of Poland before the outbreak of the 
war and included Brest Litovsk, Vilna, Grobno and Lwów.39 
By 1943, the Soviets had indeed regained much confidence in their claims on Poland. On 
January 16, 1943, the Polish Embassy at Kuibyshev, Russia, received a note which stated that 
the Soviet Union no longer regarded the entire population of eastern Poland as Polish citizens 
and that Poland’s 1920 claims of Ukraine and White Russia never were valid.40 Indeed, in the 
middle of World War II the ‘Polish Question’ was all but answered. 
 
1.2 The White player: the United States of America and Great Britain. 
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During World War II, Wladyslaw Sikorski was both Poland’s Prime Minister as he was its 
Commander in Chief. He was responsible for the Polish underground movements during 
World War I and played an important part in the siege of Warsaw in 1921, when Soviet forces 
tried to capture the capital. In 1940, after being politically inactive for several years, the 
Polish president had appointed him to lead both political and military Poland through the dark 
days of the new war. Sikorski tried whatever he could. He devised a government from 
different political parties to ensure Polish unity and tirelessly tried to pursue Polish interests in 
world diplomacy. In the first moments of World War II, however, the ‘Polish Question’ was 
not directly the first concern of the populations of Great Britain and the United States of 
America. The British, on the one hand, effectively stood alone in their fight against Nazi 
Germany. Western Europe had fallen and Great Britain was about to be attacked. Not only did 
the Polish government take refuge in London, many other governments from the European 
mainland also travelled there. Each government, of course, carried its own request for the 
British. With so much happening at the same time, Polish demands and questions concerning 
their borders could easily end up low on Britain’s list of priorities. The United States, on the 
other hand, did not yet participate in the war. Indeed, its population, with Roosevelt as one of 
the few exceptions, did everything it could to avoid U.S. troops interfering in European 
affairs.   
This, however, does not imply that the British and American were neutral spectators of what 
was happening in Poland. On September 18th, 1939, an editorial in The Times clearly 
portrayed British views.  
Only these can be disappointed who clung to the ingenious belief that Russia was to 
be distinguished from her Nazi neighbor, despite the identity of their institutions and 
political idioms, by the principles and purposes behind her foreign policy.41 
The editorial, published one day after the Soviet invasion of Poland, argued that Stalin and his 
Red Army had finally showed their true colors. A lust for power and the destruction of Poland 
and, eventually, the free world was what drove both Nazis and communists. This clear cut 
opinion should not come as a surprise. Only just before, on August, 25th, 1939, the Anglo-
Polish Treaty was signed in which the British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, gave his 
unquestionable support to the Poles. Should any of the two nations be economically 
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penetrated or to be harmed in any other way, one would come to the rescue of the other.42 
Britain, then, was allied to Poland. According to Gorodetsky, these British unilateral 
guarantees to Poland were diplomatically even more important than the Ribbentrop-Molotov 
Pact or the Munich Agreement between Chamberlain and Hitler. Chamberlain was unaware, 
as Gorodetsky argues, how difficult it was to come to Poland’s rescue. This made the Soviet 
Union a powerful player in European diplomacy. If Britain was able to secure Soviet help for 
Poland, Germany could be deterred from eastern expansion. Should the Germans secure 
Soviet neutrality in this Polish matter, the German Drang nach Osten had nothing to fear.43 
Despite all this, Britain held his promise to the Poles when Germany launched his invasion 
and declared war on the Nazis. Indeed, it still aided the Poles after the fall of France. In June 
1940, when Sikorski asked Churchill whether his government was allowed to come to 
Londen, Churchill said to the Polish Prime Minister that ‘England would keep faith with the 
Poles.’44 The government was allowed to come and the Britons also stationed and supplied a 
Polish Division in Scotland. Many years after the war, Churchill remained ever grateful for 
the Polish pilots who defended British airspace in the Battle of Britain.45 
The United States did not supply a Polish army or gave refuge to a Polish government, yet 
Poles proved to be a powerful presence across the Atlantic. A significant Polish-American 
community looked critically to what happened to the country of their forefathers. 4 per cent of 
the whole United States population was of Polish descent during World War II. Poles also 
comprised 8.4 per cent of the 34.5 million Americans ‘who were foreign born or native born 
of foreign or mixed parentage.’ Not only were there many Polish-Americans, they were also 
to be found in the most important of industrial cities. Chicago, Buffalo and New York gave 
home to three million Poles, while Cleveland and Detroit were other important urban centers 
where Poles had a powerful position. Poles and their fellow Slavs composed a majority of the 
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working force in industries such as coal mining, steel, electrical equipment, cars and rubber. 
In short, the United States government was to be aware of its Polish-American citizens when 
it was to deal with the ‘Polish Question.’ Indeed, the Polish-Americans enthusiastically 
believed that Franklin D. Roosevelt was the ideal man to solve the Question. As said by 
Stephen P. Mizwa, director of the Polish-American Kosciuszko Foundation, ‘the Polish-
Americans have a sort of religious faith in Roosevelt. So far as Roosevelt is concerned, the 
Atlantic Charter is the Bible to which they are willing to swear.’46  
This Atlantic Charter, issued by Churchill and Roosevelt on August, 1941, in Placentia Bay, 
Newfoundland, was to define British and American goals of war and became the hallmark of 
the United Nations alliance against the Axis. The Polish-Americans deemed the Charter so 
important for the inclusion of three, out of seven, important principles. First, the United 
Nations desired ‘to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed 
wishes of the peoples concerned’. Second, ‘they respect the right of all peoples to choose the 
form of government under which they will live. They are only concerned to defend the rights 
of freedom of speech and thought, without which such choice must be illusory.’ Third, ‘they 
seek a peace which will not only cast down for ever the Nazi tyranny, but by effective 
international organizations will afford to all States and peoples the means of dwelling in 
security within their own bounds and of traversing the seas and oceans without fear of lawless 
assault or the need of maintaining burdensome armaments.’47 In short, to many it seemed as if 
Britain and the United States declared that they were going to solve the questions of frontiers 
and ethnicities, those very reasons why World War II began. Only when the Axis was finally 
defeated and the war was over, every ethnic group in Europe, so many believed, was to 
receive its own country. Anthony Eden learns of this view of postponing frontier questions on 
July, 21st, 1941, when an American delegation from Roosevelt visits him: 
They told me that Roosevelt was most eager that we should not commit ourselves to 
any definite frontiers for any country before the peace treaty. H. [Harry Hopkins, 
Roosevelt’s most trusted advisor] said that U.S. would come into the war and did not 
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want to find after the event that we had all kinds of engagements of which they had 
never been told.48 
According to Eden, Churchill was not even interested in post-war problems at all. While this 
was understandable, Eden thought this view was most dangerous and hard to hold given the 
fact that the Americans wanted to do just that.49 Cordell Hull, on the other hand, was clear in 
his opinion how to handle war time questions. In his opinion, Woodrow Wilson had to deal 
with various secret accords between the Allied governments during World War I. When the 
Peace Conference of Versailles began, Wilson had to deal with each and every one of them, 
while facing the interests of each Allied power at the same time. Indeed, so Hull claims in his 
memoirs, a written, common agreement on Allied war aims never even existed. Such terrible 
mistakes were not to be made in 1941. ‘This time’, so Hull says, ‘I felt that the Allies should 
all be committed in advance to certain principles, leaving details of boundary adjustments and 
the like to be settled later. If the principles were strongly enough proclaimed and adhered to, 
the details would find readier solution when the time came to solve them.’50 
Four months after the publication of the Atlantic Charter the Japanese were to attack Pearl 
Harbor and Germany declared war on the United States shortly after that. Yet, one month 
before the Charter, something had happened that made Churchill very jubilant. On June 23rd, 
1941, both he and Eden were staying at Chequers, the Prime Ministers’ estate in Oxford, 
when Eden was awoken by a servant. The Prime Minister had sent his Foreign Secretary a 
cigar on a silver plate to celebrate the fact that Nazi Germany had invaded the Soviet Union. 
The British government warned Stalin several times of a possible German attack and now it 
had finally happened. In June, 1941, Britain was given the possibility to join forces with a 
potentially powerful, yet a most unlikely, ally in its fight against Hitler. That same night, 
Churchill addressed the English people of these developments. The man who was known for 
anti-communism and who, back in 1920, wanted to see the Soviet Union destroyed, 
emphasized that evening that ‘this is no class war, but a war in which in the whole British 
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Empire and Commonwealth of Nations is engaged, without distinction of race, creed or party 
(…).’ While Eden argued that the Soviet Union was as immoral as Nazi Germany and an ally 
which would not be trusted by the British people, Churchill argued differently. ‘Communism’, 
in his words, ‘was irrelevant.’ Kitchen argues that Churchill still detested communism at this 
time. Yet, the British Prime Minister clearly understood that every help to destroy Nazism 
was needed. If Germany was to invade the Hell called the Soviet Union, Churchill was 
prepared to promptly sign a pact with its Devil.51  
To achieve this goal, however, would prove difficult from the outset. Stalin almost 
immediately makes his wishes known to the British and American governments. The Soviet 
Marshall either wants the British and Americans to reinforce his Red Army in Russia or to 
launch a second front. The United Nations, in Stalin’s opinion, must lead a diversion on the 
western side of Germany so Hitler’s forces are to be dispersed from Russian soil. Most 
importantly, he also wants assurance from both Churchill and Roosevelt in the matter of 
Russian post-war frontiers. Stalin wanted to be sure that the United Nations accepted the 
agreements of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. Soviet authority over Eastern Europe, in short, 
was to be assured. Yet, the United States and Great Britain were not in the position to give 
their unconditional support for two reasons. First, as said above, the Atlantic Charter was 
originally designed to prevent any such agreements during wartime. Did not both Churchill 
and Roosevelt sign a document which claimed they respected the right of all peoples to 
choose the form of government under which they will live? How were the Anglo-American 
politicians going to deal with territorial changes in Poland when the Poles did not want them? 
And even if Stalin’s demands are met, does this effectively mean that the Atlantic Charter was 
not so much a blueprint for a country’s self-determination but a way of internationally 
controlling individual nations? The Allied commitment to certain principles in the Atlantic 
Charter can be found logical at first when one has WWI in the back of his head. Eventually, 
though, it was to become the biggest problem in the dilemma of choosing sides with Poland or 
Soviet Russia. Second, both Britain and the United States originally hoped to resolve 
important questions, such as frontiers, only when the war was over. Immediate Soviet 
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demands, however, forced Western politicians to reconsider those thoughts and to question 
themselves whether or not they were both willing and able to solve something difficult as the 
‘Polish Question.’ 
 
Much has been said and written about Britain and America’s handling of the Katyn affair and 
the following crisis regarding the ‘Polish Question’. What is striking is that the current 
historiography seems to be colored. The school of blame, as I call it, is dominant and needs 
not so much actual revising. In my opinion, it is good to be remembered of the great 
consequences and personal tragedies that befell the Poles both during and after World War II. 
Yet, were American and English politicians as guilty as many had charged for so long? Or 
was there more to their decisions? To achieve a compromise between the three schools, to use 
the research from the schools of innocence and blame in a way to suit the more objective 
school of reconstruction will be the goal of the rest of this chapter and the one to follow. 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: The contestants make their first moves, April - October 1943. 
 
No one can foresee how the balance of power will lie or where the winning armies 
will stand at the end of the war. It seems probable however that the United States 
and the British Empire, far from being exhausted, will be the most powerfully armed 
and economic bloc the world has even seen and that the Soviet Union will need our 
aid for reconstruction far more than we shall need theirs.52 
Winston Churchill in a note to Anthony Eden, January 8th, 1942. 
 
What this brief record shows is that the position so confidently and firmly taken by 
the British and American governments in January, 1942, was wholly at variance 
with the course that they later actually pursued. This change of policy on a matter of 
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vital significance was apparently due to no conscious decision by either of them; 
rather they seem to have drifted into it without any real apprehension of all its 
implications.53 
Former U.S. Foreign Undersecretary of State, Sumner Welles, in 1951. 
 
On April, 12th, 1943, German radio stations announced the discovery of a mass grave. It was 
found within the Soviet Union and consisted over 4,000 bodies of Polish officers. Nazi 
Germany immediately accused the Russians of killing those officers three years before, in 
1940. The Polish Daily, a newspaper for Polish refugees in London, argued nothing was 
wrong. Instead, it immediately claimed that these findings within the forest of Katyn, near 
Smolensk were a ‘terrible accusation’ and it ‘may be yet another lie of German propaganda, 
aimed at impairing Polish-Soviet relations.’54 This discovery, however, was to put the 
Alliance of the United Nations to the test. From April, 1943, to August, 1943, government 
officials within the United States and Great Britain were beginning to ask themselves 
important questions. These questions were so important that they might influence the rest of 
the war and the upcoming decisions regarding the post war world. In this chapter, we take a 
look at this German discovery and how it made the ‘Polish Question’ important once again. 
  
2.1 The game begins: the importance of ‘Katyn.’ 
When one searches the diaries and memoirs of such important British politicians as Foreign 
Secretary Anthony Eden and Prime Minister Winston Churchill for their views on Katyn, 
almost nothing can be found. Eden does not describe anything about Katyn in his post war 
memoirs. Instead, he describes his journeys to India. Churchill does name the German 
discovery in the Soviet forest either, albeit briefly. He quotes a few of his own lines, for 
example, to Polish Prime Minister Sikorski. In one of them, he tells his Eastern European 
colleague that if the Polish officers had indeed died, there was nothing they could do to bring 
them back. To the Russian Ambassador in Londen, Ivan Maisky, Churchill supposedly said 
that ‘this was no time for quarrels and charges.’ ‘We have got to beat Hitler’, the Russian was 
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told. Indeed, Churchill writes in his memoirs that it was unimportant for him to write about 
Katyn. Eventually, he says, details of what happened would become known and the truth 
would be revealed. In his words, as if being a guilty man, ‘everybody is entitled to form his 
own opinion.’55 In short, Eden and Churchill did not want to write about Katyn after World 
War II had ended. To a certain extent, this is understandable. The German discovery of a 
Polish mass grave in Soviet Union territory, announced on April, 12th, 1943, was the 
beginning of a diplomatic fight between four members of the United Nations. Poland, the 
Soviet Union, Great Britain and the United States were to consult, to influence, to overrule 
and even to betray one another in a struggle for achieving their own goals.  
German accusations were made in a period of time when the Soviet Union seemed to be very 
popular in British and American public opinion. From March to April, 1943, Gallup-polls 
were held in England in order to find out which of the Allied countries was considered the 
most popular. The results were somewhat of a surprise: 
Considering what each of these countries could do, which one do you think is 
trying hardest to win the war? 
 U.S.A.:  2% 
 China:  5% 
 Britain:  33% 
 Russia:  60% 
 Which country of the United Nations do you think has so far made the greatest single 
 contribution towards winning the war? 
 U.S.A.: 3% 
 China: 5% 
 Britain: 42% 
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 Russia: 50%56 
In 1941, Eden warned Churchill about British distrust to Stalin and his Soviet Union 
becoming an ally against Germany. Not only was he a communist, and therefore should he be 
distrusted, he had committed many crimes against his own people in the 1930’s. Soviet 
victory in Stalingrad, the heroics displayed by the Russian people and a changing public 
appearance of Stalin had evidently changed this critical view two years later. Stalin was no 
longer the evil, eastern dictator who had collaborated with Hitler. Indeed, he had become a 
hallmark, a symbol of the Alliance against Germany. On January, 4th, 1943, the influential 
American magazine TIME pronounced Stalin ‘Man of the Year’ and gave the Russian a place 
on its cover.57 German propagandists were aware of Russia’s changing public appearance. 
They searched deliberately for something to accuse the Soviet Union with and to create 
confusion within the Alliance. On April, 17th, 1943, five days after the Germans had 
launched their accusations, a diary contained the following words: 
The Katyn incident is developing into gigantic political affair which may have wide 
repercussion. We are exploiting it in every manner possible.58  
The writer of this entry was Josef Goebbels, German Minister for Propaganda. Clearly, he 
was a satisfied man.  
The German accusations of what had happened in Katyn made the ‘Polish Question’, the 
settlement of Polish borders between mainly Poland and the Soviet Union, even more 
important. The Polish government-in-exile, from 1940 onward, suspected that the Russians 
had committed a terrible crime against some of its officers. Germany’s discovery could be a 
confirmation of fears long held by the London Poles. On April, 17th, 1943, the Polish Minister 
of National Defense, Lt. General Marian Kukiel, issued a communiqué which describes how 
long the Poles have been searching for their missing officers: 
On the 17th of September 1940 the official organ of the Red Army, the Red Star stated 
that during the fighting which took place after the 17th of September 1939, 181,000 
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Polish prisoners of war were taken by the Soviets; the number of regular officers and 
those of the reserve among them amounted to about 10,000. According to information 
in possession of the Polish Government, three large camps of Polish prisoners were set 
up in the U.S.S.R. in November 1939: 
1. in Kozielsk – East of Smolensk 
2. in Starobielsk – near Kharkov, and 
3. in Ostrashkow – near Kalinin, where police and military police 
 were concentrated. 
(…). 
When after the conclusion of the Polish-Soviet Treaty of the 30th of July 1941 and the 
signing of the military agreement of the 14th August 1941, the Polish Government 
proceeded to form the Polish Army in U.S.S.R., it was to be expected that the officers 
from the above mentioned camps would form above all the cadres of higher and lower 
commanders of the rising Army. A group of Polish officers from Griazoviec arrived to 
join the Polish units in Buzuluk at the end of August 1941, not one officer however 
appeared from among those deported in another direction from Kozielsk, Starobielsk, 
and Osthashkov. In all therefore about 8,300 were missing, not counting another 7,000 
composed of N.C.O.’s, soldiers and civilians, who were in those camps at the time of 
their liquidation.59 
The Polish government-in-exile knew that Polish prisoners from Kozielsk were sent to an area 
near Smolensk and that they were not heard of ever since. The Soviet Union never replied to 
questions in this matter. Now, the Poles wanted to know the truth: 
We have become used to the lies of German propaganda and we understand the 
purpose behind its latest revelations. Faced however with abundant and detailed 
German information concerning the discovery near Smolensk of many thousand 
bodies of Polish officers, and categorical statement that they were murdered by the 
Soviet authority in the spring of 1940, the necessity has arisen that the mass graves 
which have been discovered should be investigated and the facts quoted, verified by a 
proper international body, such as the International Red Cross. The Polish 
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Government has therefore approached this institution with a view of sending a 
delegation to the place where the massacre of the Polish prisoners of war is said to 
have taken place.60 
Russia was furious, while Great Britain and the United States had not been consulted before 
the communiqué was issued. The London Poles sent their request to Geneva, only to find that 
they were not the only ones who had done so. Indeed, in a smart propagandist move the 
Germans also formally requested the International Red Cross for an inquiry in the Katyn 
killings. Only one hour separated the arrival of the two requests. Stalin had seen and heard 
enough. On April, 26th, 1943, the Soviet Union broke all diplomatic relationships with the 
Polish government-in-exile in London, making every agreement between the two countries 
non void. According to the Soviet leader, Poland and Germany were secret allies and both 
ganged up on his nation. Going even further, Stalin immediately contacted a group of Poles in 
Moscow and asked them to form a Polish government of their own. From now on, then, the 
Soviet Union seemed very close to breaking all ties with the United Nations, while trying to 
meet its Eastern Polish demands on its very own. If the ‘Polish Question’ was close to be 
answered, it now had to be re-asked altogether for the sake of keeping the Alliance together. 
 
2.2 White moves to the rescue. April – October, 1943. 
The diplomatic crisis between the Soviet Union and the London Poles after the announcement 
of the Katyn findings was to bring difficult questions to politicians from Great Britain and the 
United States of America. Throughout 1943 and 1944 they had to decide which side they 
were on. Were they to choose Stalin’s Soviet Union, the ally who was maybe following a 
double agenda but was militarily powerful enough to check Germany’s advance? Or was 
Poland to be chosen? The ally for which Great Britain originally went to war and who had 
supported the war effort as far as it could? Whatever the outcome would be, the choice would 
be hard.  
Well before the Katyn crisis, British and Americans politicians were already being pressed to 
do something for Poland before the Germans announced their discovery of the mass graves 
near Smolensk. The government-in-exile repeatedly asked Britain and the United States for 
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help. Officers from Kozielsk, so they said, were missing and Great Britain and the United 
States should ask what had happened to them. The London Poles tried to find their 
whereabouts, but the Soviet government never replied to their questions in full satisfaction. 
The Poles were so keen for assistance that even Sikorski’s wife tried to enlist the aid of 
Eleanor Roosevelt in this matter. The Western leaders responded. On April, 27th, 1942, United 
States Admiral and Ambassador to the Soviet Union, William H. Standley, formally asked the 
Soviets what had happened to those missing Polish prisoners of war. The Admiral received 
word from Soviet officials that the Poles had been released two years earlier. The Russian 
government, however, was unaware of where these people were. Perhaps they had left for the 
Caucasus or Kazakhstan, but they could not be 100 per cent sure. The British as well asked 
questions about the prisoners and were rebuffed. It was after the fall of communism and the 
opening of Soviet archives in the 1990s which led to the discovery that Stalin himself had 
signed the order to shoot the missing Poles, of which they claimed never to have had any idea 
at all what had happened to them.61 British and American officials could only guess 
something was wrong. Yet, rising difficulties with Stalin led Anthony Eden to exclaim in 
1942 that ‘it already seemed likely that the Soviets intended to divide and rule their western 
neighbors.’  
Anthony Eden, Britain’s Foreign Secretary, is most critical in his memoirs to Soviet dealings 
with the West before Katyn. Well before the German accusations were to create a diplomatic 
rift and made solving the ‘Polish Question’ even more urgent, the Briton seems to suggest that 
Poland’s future was heavily discussed before all that. While Eden strangely enough does not 
devote any word to Katyn in his memoirs, he does recount a visit to Franklin Roosevelt in 
Washington in March, 1943: 
We then discussed in some detail the Russian demands, as explained to me by [Ivan] 
Maisky [Soviet Ambassador in London] before I left London. Somewhat to my 
surprise, Roosevelt did not seem to foresee any great difficulty over the Polish 
question. He thought that if Poland had East Prussia and perhaps some concessions in 
Silesia, she would gain rather than lose by agreeing to the Curzon line. In any event, 
Britain, the United States and Russia should decide at the appropriate time what was a 
just solution and Poland would have to accept (…). The big question which rightly 
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dominated Roosevelt’s mind was whether it was possible to work with Russia now 
and after the war. He wanted to know what I thought of the view that Stalin’s aim was 
to overrun and communize the Continent. I replied that it was impossible to give a 
definite opinion. Even if these fears were to prove correct, we should make the 
position no worse by trying to work with Russia and by assuming that Stalin meant 
what he said in the Anglo-Soviet Treaty. I might well have added that Soviet policy is 
both Russian and communist, in varying degree.62 
As the Soviet Union grew more popular in public opinion and its armies grew in strength, it 
seems that politicians were becoming aware of how important Russia could become in the 
future. Roosevelt began to see the Soviet Union as one of the ‘five police-men’, nations 
responsible for world peace. Indeed, the more likely it became that the communist state would 
survive Germany’s attacks, the more both American and British Foreign Offices were 
beginning to anticipate eventual Soviet domination in Eastern Europe. Whether Stalin would 
use his power for the sake of the United Nations or for communist glory steadily became an 
important point of discussion within the Anglo-American governments after the April, 17th, 
1943.63 
After the breaking of Polish-Soviet diplomatic relations, Churchill and Roosevelt tried 
whatever they could to keep Stalin and Sikorski together.  Historians have, however, used 
Churchill’s assurances to Soviet Ambassador Maisky on April, 23rd, 1943, in different ways. 
The British Prime Minister noted, ‘we shall certainly oppose vigorously any investigation by 
the International Red Cross or any other body in any territory under German authority. Such 
investigation would be a fraud and its conclusions reached by terrorism.’64 Another example 
of a difficult interpretable text comes from Eden. He tells Sikorski on April, 24th, 1943, that 
the British Government did not believe the Germans, yet ‘it could not estrange such a 
powerful ally [as the Soviet Union]’. He recommended the Polish Prime Minister to take back 
his request to the International Red Cross and to denounce German claims ‘as it was 
imperative for the sake of the common cause.’65 To some, these remarks are ample proof of 
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an Allied betrayal to the country for which they went to war in 1939. This, however, is not the 
case. Instead of willingly denouncing aid to the Poles, it seems as if the British and Americans 
were not yet fully sure whether the Germans were actually speaking the truth. Just as the 
London Poles were keen to know what had really happened near Smolensk, Churchill and 
Roosevelt wondered who was right and who was wrong. As was noted by a German spy in 
American service, Roosevelt interpreted the German announcement as an attempt to split the 
United Nations. Of course, the American President was right in this regard and the German-
American spy also noted the propagandist value of the Katyn massacre. Yet, he knew 
Goebbels and the Nazi government well and believed the situation was much more 
complicated than Roosevelt believed. The spy suspected Goebbels’ henchmen were telling the 
truth this time.66 
Correspondence between Roosevelt and Stalin shows how the two tried to deal with the 
Soviet-Polish break. Contacts between the two Anglo-Saxon statesmen were very good, for 
they wrote reports to one another on a frequent basis. When reading these dispatches, it seems 
as if the two statesmen were doing everything they could within their power, albeit carefully, 
to intervene between Stalin and Sikorski. Churchill, for instance, hands Roosevelt a copy of a 
dispatch he sent to Stalin on April, 26th, 1943. In it, Churchill urges Stalin not to press home 
his accusations as well as trying carefully to bring Stalin to different thoughts: 
Mr. Eden is seeing Sikorski today and will press him as strongly as possible to 
withdraw all countenance from any investigation under Nazi auspices. (…). He 
[Sikorski] is in danger of being overthrown by the Poles who consider that he has not 
stood up sufficiently for his people against the Soviets. If he should go we should only 
get someone worse. (…).67 
Churchill also urged Stalin to consider his attitude to Poland as a ‘final warning rather than a 
break’. Also, Churchill requested that ‘no announcement should be made until every other 
plan has been tried.’ Kimball notes there was not much Churchill could have done. As 
historical context to Churchill’s dispatch to Stalin, he describes how the London Poles were 
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told that England had little leverage with the Russian government. Soviet military successes 
and a slow Allied advance in Northern Africa were to blame for that. 
Roosevelt sent Stalin a similar message. He understood the Soviet’s problems, but he wished 
to see that relationships between the London Poles and the Russians had not yet ended. 
Instead, he hoped that talks were merely suspended. To Roosevelt, it was out of the question 
whether Sikorski had co-operated with the Nazis. The President was also aware of the anti-
Nazism from the Polish-American community and he urged Stalin to realize that ‘knowledge 
of a complete break between you and Sikorski would not help the situation.’68 Just like 
Churchill, Roosevelt hoped to carefully bring the two nations back together again. Both the 
British Prime Minister and the American President realized the potential dangers of a rift to 
the war time alliance and hoped to intervene without having to take definite sides fore either 
power. Indeed, Roosevelt responded to Churchill’s message in an approving way: 
I like your telegram to Stalin very much and will read it to the Cabinet today. We must 
work together to heal this breach. So far it has been Goebbels’ show. 
On April, 28th, 1943, Churchill sent Roosevelt a more jubilant copy of a dispatch to the 
Russians. The two leaders seem to approach the Polish-Russian crisis in a similar way: 
The Poles are issuing tonight the communiqué in my immediately following. You will 
see that we have persuaded them to shift the argument from the dead to the living and 
from the past to the future. So far this business has been Goebbels’ greatest triumph. 
He is now busy suggesting that the U.S.S.R. will set up a Polish government on 
Russian soil and deal only with them. We should not, of course, be able to recognize 
such a Government and continue our relations with Sikorski who is far the most 
helpful man you or we are likely to find for the purposes of the common cause. I 
expect that this will also be the American view. My own feeling is that they [the 
Poles] have had a shock and that after whatever interval is thought convenient the 
relationship established on July, 30, 1941, should be restored. No one will hate this 
more than Hitler and what he hates most is wise for us to do so.69  
British and American aims in the Katyn crisis of 1943 were clear. The Poles were to drop 
their stone cold character, as should the Soviet allegations be played down and a potential 
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threat of a Russian-Polish rival government in Moscow prevented. On April, 30th, 1943, 
Roosevelt did not send this dispatch to Churchill, for reasons unknown. Yet, he again 
approved with Churchill’s message to Stalin: 
You are quite correct in expressing the belief that we share your view that Sikorski is 
the most helpful Polish leader we or the Russians are likely to find for the purposes of 
the common cause. The setting up of a rival Polish government by the Soviet 
government constitutes in my opinion the chief danger at the present time and should 
be avoided at all costs. I believe you have chosen exactly the right line with Stalin on 
this point. (…). Unless the other Allied nations can prevail on Russia and Poland to 
adopt a course of collaboration with all members of the United Nations and to declare 
a truce with regard to all controversial questions likely to impede the prosecution of 
the war, our whole effort will be jeopardized impeded. The winning of the war is the 
paramount objective for all of us. For this unity is necessary. All individualistic and 
nationalistic ambitions in the meantime must be held in abeyance. We must close our 
ranks one every front for the prosecution of the war. This is the only road to 
freedom.70 
Recently, with Churchill saying that ‘if he [Sikorski] should go, we should only get somebody 
worse’, Laurence Rees argued that the British Prime Minister was being ‘brutally pragmatic’ 
to the Poles. Rees also mentions Churchill saying to Eden on April, 28th, 1943, that ‘there is 
no use prowling morbidly round the three-year-old graves at Smolensk.’71 Churchill and 
Roosevelt’s position in the Katyn crisis during April 1943, however, looks clearly enough 
according to their own war time correspondence. The two considered themselves arbitraries in 
a German-caused rift which could potentially destroy both the United Nations alliance as a 
future solution to prevent another world war. Poland was not to be doubted for and Sikorski 
was as good as a war time leader one could get. Goebbels, however, had dealt enough damage 
and it was to be repaired fast. Who had committed the Katyn crimes was not the most 
important question to be answered in the diplomacy of April, 1943. 
In the meanwhile, however, discussion had sprung within governmental organization of Great 
Britain and the United States about Polish actions in response to Goebbels’ propaganda. Some 
Americans, for example, were angry with the London Poles and their formal request of 
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inquiry to the International Red Cross. Stephen Biddle, a United States ambassador in London, 
asked aloud why Sikorski had not consulted London and Washington before sending a 
message to Geneva. ‘That’, said Biddle, ‘had unfortunately created the impression in my mind 
to effect that when his government was making trouble, it preferred not to consult us. When it 
got into trouble, it looked to us to get it out.’72 William Harriman, Roosevelt’s special envoy 
in Europe, was also critical of Polish actions. In a conversation with Sikorski on May, 1st, 
1943, the Polish Prime Minister acknowledged that the request had been a great mistake, yet it 
was issued under great pressure from his government and behind Sikorski’s back due to 
illness. Still, Sikorski feared a Soviet takeover of the whole of Eastern Europe if Stalin 
persisted in his break with the London Poles. Harriman, however, told him that the Polish 
settlement was to have disastrous effects in Moscow whether the German accusations were 
true or not.73 In the British Foreign Office, a few people asked themselves whether it was 
right for Britain to arbitrate between Poland and Russia. If the mass graves were indeed 
created by the Soviets, was it right to silence a major war crime from a powerful ally? Bell 
emphasizes that this discussion was excluded from public opinion. Indeed, while wondering 
what was morally good, British politicians were glad to see that the attention in the press for 
Katyn had slowly died down in May, 1943.74  
April 1943, then, was all about keeping damage to the war time alliance and Polish-Soviet 
relations to an absolute minimum. Roosevelt and Churchill immediately responded to keep 
the alliance together. However, Katyn had not yet fully turned into the moral question it was 
to become. Indeed, in May, 1943, in Goebbels’ words, the Katyn affair was yet to drive a 
deep wedge between the Allies. In public, nobody could see this. Internally, however, Katyn’s 
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aftermath was to raise moral issues on the ‘Polish Question’ to new heights. These long term 
effects of the Katyn massacres will now be dealt with. 
On August, 13, 1943, Churchill sent Roosevelt another message. This time it contained an 
internal memorandum from Britain’s Ambassador to Poland, Sir Owen O’Malley. Churchill 
described it as ‘a grim, well-written story, but perhaps a little too well-written.’ It would 
certainly be worthwhile for Roosevelt to read it, Churchill suggested. Also, he wanted to have 
it back when Roosevelt had finished reading it ‘as we are not circulating it officially in any 
way.’75 O’Malley argued Soviet guilt in the Katyn affair, yet no he was aware there was not 
much to do for the British government. 
But though of positive indications as to what subsequently happened to the 10,000 
officers there was none until the grave at Katyn was opened, there is now avalable a 
good deal of negative evidence, the cumulative effect of which is to throw serious 
doubt on Russian disclaimers of responsibility for the massacre. (...). In handling the 
publicity side of the Katyn affair, we have been constrained by the urgent need for 
cordial relations with the Soviet government to appear to appraise the evidence with 
more hesitation and lenience than we should do in forming a common sense judgment 
on events occurring in normal times or in the ordinary course of our private lives; we 
have been obliged to appear to distort the normal and healthy operation of our 
intellectual and moral judgments; we have been obliged to give undue prominence to 
the tactlessness or impulsiveness of Poles, to restrain the Poles from putting their case 
clearly before the public, to discourage an attempt by the public and the press to probe 
the ugly story to the bottom. In general we have been obliged to deflect attention for 
possibilities which in the ordinary affairs of life would cry to high heaven for 
elucidation, and to withhold the full measure of solicitude which, in other 
circumstances, would be shown to acquaintances situated as Poles now are. We have 
in fact perforce used the good name of England like the murderers used the little 
conifers to cover up a massacre; and in view of the immense importance of an 
appearance and of the heroic resistance of Russia to Germany, few will think that any 
other course would have been wise or right. (...). This dislocation between our public  
attitude and our private feelings we may know to be deliberate and inevitable; but at 
the same time we may perhaps wonder whether, by representing to others something 
less than the whole truth as far as we know it, and something less than the 
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probabilities so far as they seem to us probable, we are not incurring a risk of what - 
not to put a fine point on it - might darken our vision and take the edge off our moral 
sensibility.76  
In Maresch’ opinion, the responses from the British Foreign Office were clear cut. Especially, 
the reaction from the Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Sir Alexander Cadogan, 
said much: 
(…) quite clearly for the moment, there is nothing to be done. As to what circulation 
we give to this explosive material, I find it difficult to make up my mind. Of course, it 
would be only honest to circulate it. But as we know (all admit) that the knowledge of 
this evidence can not effect our cause of action or policy, is there any advantage in 
exposing more individuals than necessary to the spiritual conflict that a reading of this 
dispatch excites?77 
While agreeing with O’Malley and feeling much sympathy for the Poles, the British Foreign 
Office concluded it simply could not do anything against Russia. Indeed, how much O’Malley 
sided with the Poles, even he knew that the British government could not bring his 
information out into the open. It was immensely dangerous, as it was capable of destroying 
the entire wartime alliance and the ideal way of shattering Stalin’s positive image in Western 
public opinion. Also, the Atlantic Charter would become meaningless. How could such a 
powerful nation, who had violated human rights by massacring innocent people, ever uphold 
such principles as outlined in Placenta Bay? If the truth could have so many consequences, 
was it not better to conceal it from public opinion? In May, 1943, Churchill, Cadogan, Eden 
and Clark Kerr, the Ambassador in Moscow, were beginning to realize that Stalin was indeed 
responsible for the mass graves near Smolensk. The Germans had not lied. However, in Bell’s 
opinion, it was impossible to let this truth affect their policy. Instead, the British had to fight 
hard to keep Polish-Soviet reconciliation a viable option and keeping the alliance very much 
alive.78 
                                                          
76
 Rohan D’Olier Butler, ‘The Katyn Massacre and Reactions in the Foreign Office Memorandum by the 
Historical Adviser’ in: Departmental Series Eastern European & Soviet Department ENP 10/2 (1973) 9-12; 
Rees, Behind Closed Doors, 188-189. 
77
 Eugenia Maresch, Katyn 1940. The Documentary Evidence of the West’s Betrayal (Stroud 2010) 49. 
78
 Bell, ‘Censorship’, 71. 
40 
 
By the time Churchill sent Roosevelt the disturbing O’Malley report, little could he have 
known that the White House seemed to have made up its mind on its position against Russia. 
On August 2nd, 1943, Harry Hopkins, Roosevelt’s most trusted advisor, received the 
following note from a special investigation committee. This committee was determined to 
find out whether the Soviet Union was a reliable ally and Hopkins now received the results of 
their research: 
Russia’s position in War II is in marked contrast with that which she occupied in 
[World] War I. She collapsed before the termination of [World] War I and had no effect 
whatsoever in the final defeat of Germany, which was accomplished by the Allies 
without her assistance. In [World] War II, Russia occupies a dominant position and is the 
decisive factor looking toward the defeat of the Axis in Europe. While in Sicily the 
forces of Great Britain and the United States are being opposed by 2 German divisions, 
the Russian front is receiving attention of approximately 200 German divisions. 
Whenever the Allies open a second front on the continent, it will be decidedly 
a secondary front to that of Russia; theirs will continue to be the main effort. Without 
Russia in the war, the Axis cannot be defeated in Europe, and the position of the United 
Nations becomes precarious. 
Similarly, Russia’s post-war position in Europe will be a dominant one. With Germany 
crushed, there is no power in Europe to oppose her tremendous military forces. It is true 
that Great Britain is building up a position in the Mediterranean vis-á-vis Russia that she 
may find useful in balancing power in Europe. However, even here she may not be able 
to oppose Russia unless she is otherwise supported. 
The conclusions from the foregoing are obvious. Since Russia is the decisive factor in 
the war, she must be given every assistance and every effort must be made to obtain her 
friendship. Likewise, since without question she will dominate Europe on the defeat of 
the Axis, it is even more essential to develop and maintain the most friendly relations 
with Russia. 
Finally, the most important factor in the United States has to consider in relation to 
Russia is the prosecution of the war in the Pacific. With Russia as an ally in the war 
against Japan, the war can be terminated in less time and at less expense in life and 
resource than if the reverse were the case. Should the war in the Pacific have to be 
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carried on with an unfriendly, or negative attitude on the part of Russia, the difficulties 
will be immeasurably increased and operations might become abortive.79 
The British seemed to be aware of what had happened in Katyn, the Americans might have 
been. Yet, both governments seemed to have decided that this new information had come too 
late. Russia’s importance in the war was now too great to put at risk. It was, however, a 
choice between the lesser of two evils. Britain, with O’Malley as its most illustrative example, 
was fully aware of what had happened in Katyn. Yet, they also knew the dangers of telling the 
truth. Was His Majesty’s Government to protect its loyal ally, with the effect of potentially 
destroying the entire Alliance or was it to hide the truth? It appears she choose the latter. The 
United States considered Russia to be the missing link in its war effort and, therefore, 
considered her friendship to be of vital importance. However, being the creators of a 
document which claimed that a nations’ self-determination was one of the hallmarks of 
fighting World War II, this was to pose difficulties for Roosevelt and his administration. How 
far was the United States to go, in order to satisfy Soviet needs? These dilemmas led to 
gloomy researches from many historians. In the opinion of, for example, Sanford, Poland’s 
fate had already been sealed in the summer of 1943. When Sikorski suddenly died in a plane 
crash in June 1943, Poland’s future looked even bleaker. With his death, Sanford continues to 
argue, the unity that had existed within the Polish government was no more. From that 
moment on, Stanislaw Mikolajczyk became the new Prime Minister of Poland, with 
Kazimierz Sosnkowski as its new Commander in Chief. The latter was known to be a bitter 
anti-Soviet.80 
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Chapter 3: The White King and Queen argue, November – December 1943. 
If it was right to proclaim the principle that the United States would not agree to 
and would not recognize any territorial changes made in the course of the war, it 
was inappropriate to assert at the same time that the countries which had territorial 
disputes would not recover sovereignty until the end of the war.81 
Mikolajczyk in November 1943. He sums up his anger to the American delegacy of 
the Foreign Ministers’ Conference in Moscow. 
 
Our armed strength, our material resources, the moral authority of President 
Roosevelt and, even more perhaps, our allies’ need of us, would give us infinitely 
greater leverage now than we could have after the victory was won [after World 
War I]. (…). The principles for postwar policy laid down by the Atlantic Charter 
provided an altogether desirable pattern. Yet, they constituted a pattern and nothing 
more.
82
 
Former Foreign Undersecretary of State, Sumner Welles, in 1951. 
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At the end of 1943, the Red Army continued its swift advance on Poland’s borders. On 
September, 26th, 1943, Russian forces recaptured Smolensk and the forest of Katyn. They 
immediately renounced the German accusations that the Soviet Union had committed the 
crime and started their own inquiry to prove the opposite. While O’Malley tried to prove 
Soviet guilt to the British government, the Russians were now starting to forge a story of their 
own. The Polish government-in-exile was still denounced, seen as a collaborator of the Soviet 
Union’s German enemy.  Yet, while Polish-Soviet relations seemed to decline, the relations 
between Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin seemed to improve. Indeed, it was in this period that 
two important conferences were held between the most important people of the three 
governments. First, there is the Foreign Secretaries Conference in Moscow. From October, 
18th to November, 11th, 1943, the Foreign Secretaries of Great Britain, the United States and 
the Soviet Union met in Moscow and paved the way for the first meeting of the war time 
allied leaders. In the Tehran Conference from November 28th to December 1st, 1943, 
Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin met face to face for the first time. Surely, Polish-Soviet 
relations must have been raised in these important conferences?  
 
3.1 The difference shows: the Foreign Ministers Conference in Moscow. 
When preparations for the Conference in Moscow began, the British delegation was well 
prepared. Anthony Eden had visited Moscow two years earlier, just after Germany’s invasion 
in the communist nation. According to his interpreter, Arthur Birse, nothing was to be new 
about Moscow or meeting with Russian Foreign Secretary Vyacheslav Molotov. Yes, the 
topics to be discussed were vast. Molotov wanted to talk about the second front, the question 
when the United States and Great Britain were going to launch a proper assault on the 
European continent. American Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, was authorized to discuss a 
Four-Power Declaration on war aims and to form an international organization to keep the 
peace after Germany’s defeat. Eden himself wanted to enhance consultation between the 
Allies on European questions connected with the war.83 Yet, Eden was thought to know well 
who he was going to visit. Birse noted, however, a difference from Eden’s visit to Moscow. 
‘He [Eden]’, as Birse says, ‘must have found certain changes in the appearance of the city, 
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compared with what he had seen two years earlier when the outcome of the war was still in 
doubt.’84 Russia’s position in the war had become increasingly stronger and therefore many 
within the English and American governments believed Germany was going to lose the war. 
Hitler’s downfall was no longer a question ‘if’, it had become a question ‘when.’ The 
conferences in Moscow and Tehran were to decide how to speed up that process and what 
was to be done when the war was over. In this environment of making important decisions for 
the future, the ‘Polish Question’ and the re-establishment of diplomatic relations between 
Poland and Russia indeed played their part. As can be seen in the accounts of Anthony Eden 
and Cordell Hull, two of the most important participants of the Moscow Conference, Poland 
was discussed in this meeting. Whether Poles, Americans or Britons liked it, however, 
remains to be seen. 
In the summer of 1943, Roosevelt held a meeting with his advisors and Hull in preparation for 
the upcoming conference of the three Foreign Secretaries. In this meeting in the White House, 
Poland’s borders were an important topic to the American President. Roosevelt opted that the 
‘Polish Question’ should be solved with a Polish-Soviet frontier ‘somewhat east of the 
Curzon Line, with Lwow going to Poland.’ Also, he told his advisors that Stalin should accept 
his solution on ‘moral grounds’. Roosevelt thought that the Soviet Union’s military position 
in Eastern Europe was much stronger than it was ever before. Russia’s advance should be 
stalled in Eastern Poland, or else they might be able to claim Germany or even continental 
Europe as their own. Poland, however, was not a matter for which the United States of 
America was going to war against the Soviet Union. Of course, the current war against Japan 
and Germany could not allow such a thing. The Americans, however, were aware of Russia’s 
important role in the post war world. A future third world war was to be prevented at all costs 
by five countries, the ‘five policemen’, who could patrol and guide the world in peace. The 
Soviet Union was to become one of these five nations. In the summer of 1943, then, 
Roosevelt was willing to appeal personally to the Russian leader and to urge him to accept the 
President’s solution on Poland. On the one hand, the Polish nation was to be preserved, and 
Russia’s inevitable advance was to be checked before it happened. On the other hand, Stalin 
was to be pleased with receiving the territories he so longed for well before the Molotov-
Ribbentrop Act in 1939, as well as to be guaranteed to become a part of the international 
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organization to safeguard peace after World War II had ended.85 In 1943, the United States 
Government seemed to be having two different agendas with Poland. On the one hand, the old 
faithful ally was to be preserved as it was their good right. On the other hand, however, one 
might argue that Poland was to become a buffer state to check a Russian advance into 
Western Europe. 
A few months later, when Eden met Hull in preparation for Moscow, the British Foreign 
Secretary notices American reluctance in putting certain topics on the conference table: 
We agreed that if our two countries had to make concessions, we must be ready to 
table our needs in return. I gave Mr. Hull a note about probable Russian demands, 
pointing out that neither the British, nor, as far as I know, the United States 
Government had ever given the Russians any list of their views. My chief concern was 
that if these questions were left until the Soviet armies re-entered Poland, Polish-
Soviet differences would be all the harder to solve.86 
Anthony Eden was not aware of Roosevelt’s personal opinion a few months before and 
believed the American delegation was not authorized to discuss Poland’s future at the Foreign 
Secretaries Conference. It seems, then, that the United States government had changed their 
opinion with regard to solving the ‘Polish Question’ well before the Conference had started. 
Hull’s entries in his own memoirs confirm such a view: 
Both our governments should be in a position at all times to exert their best efforts and 
influence to restore relations between Russia and Poland. But this influence is likely to 
be impaired, as the British aide-memoire well states, if one of our Governments agrees 
to represent the interests of Poland at Moscow. The Russians, being a very suspicious 
people, are not favorably disposed toward this policy in any respect; and it would be 
easy for either the British or this Government to jeopardize its good standing with 
Russia, which is all important to maintain in the present and the future as well.87 
Eden was clearly surprised of such a view. He, as we shall see later on, seems to have sided 
with the Poles and wanted to at least raise the ‘Polish Question’ in Moscow: 
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But there was one ominous void in our discussions. In recent months the Soviet armies 
had advanced some two hundred miles on the central and the southern sectors of the 
front. Once they were into Poland, our negotiating power, slender as it was anyway, 
would amount to very little. With this in mind I had to talk with Mr. Hull, but I found 
him most unwilling to make any move. He argued that he had no instructions about 
Poland and that he could not go beyond his authority. This seemed to me 
unnecessarily reserved, because I was not suggesting detailed discussion about 
frontiers. The Polish Government had told me they were not ready for this, only that 
we should show keen concern for Poland’s future. But I was unable to shake Mr. Hull. 
Nevertheless, I decided to raise the subject on October 29th and began with a reference 
to the absence of diplomatic relations between Poland and the Soviet Union. I said that 
we were concerned because we had played no small part in bringing about the Soviet-
Polish Agreement of 1941. The present position created embarrassment for us all.88 
The entry on the final Protocol of the conference stated about Poland that merely ‘an 
exchange of views took place.’ The re-establishment of Polish-Russian relations was not 
discussed in Moscow, neither was the question of where Poland’s frontiers were going to be. 
Hull was relieved. In his opinion, Poland was a ‘Pandora’s box of infinite trouble’, a delicate 
matter that should not be handled in any way before the war had ended. If discussion arose of 
Russia’s boundary issues in Moscow, Hull could have endangered the Four-Nation 
Declaration on the United States Organization to which the American government had placed 
its post war hopes.89 When the American Secretary of State returned in Washington, then, he 
was jubilant: 
I had never felt in better voice than when I spoke to the joint session of Congress on 
November 18. Attention seemed rapt. ‘From the outset’, I said, ‘the dominant thought 
at the conference was that, after the attainment of victory, cooperation among peace-
loving nations in support of certain paramount mutual interests will be almost as 
compelling in importance and necessity as it is today in support of the war effort’. I 
pointed out that, although we reached important agreements, there were no secret 
agreements and none had been suggested. Analyzing the achievements of the 
conference, particularly the Four-Nation Declaration, I said: ‘As the provisions of the 
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Four-Nation Declaration are carried into effect, there will no longer be need for 
spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other of the special 
arrangements through which in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their 
security or to promote their interests. The question of boundaries, I said, had, by its 
very nature, to be left in abeyance until the termination of hostilities. This was in 
accordance with the position maintained for some time by our Government. ‘Of 
supreme importance,’ I pointed out, ‘is the fact that at the conference the whole spirit 
of international cooperation, now and after the war, was revitalized and given practical 
expression.’90 
The British and American participants in Moscow, then, seem to differ greatly in their 
opinions from one another. Both Eden and Hull knew Poland was a difficult question to 
answer. After Katyn, the gap between Russia and Poland was almost impossible to cross. It 
seems, however, that the British delegation was more prepared to answer it, or at least name 
their views on it, than their American counterparts. It led to outcries after the war from both 
important participants in the Roosevelt administration as well as modern day historians. 
William Harriman, United States Ambassador in Moscow, noted he was dead opposed to the 
appeasement policy toward Russia. ‘I feel strongly’, Harriman wrote in 1943, ‘that we must 
be friendly and frank but firm when they behave in a manner which is incompatible with our 
ideas. Otherwise, we are storing up trouble for the future. I am also convinced that Stalin will 
have greater confidence and respect for us, as an ally in the war and post war. These views, I 
have held and expressed for at least 18 months.’91 This diplomatic dilemma of pleasing Russia 
or anger them by fighting for Poland’s rights made some say that things such as the Katyn 
massacre were embarrassing and should be ignored as far as possible.92 
 
3.2 The difference turns into disagreement: the Tehran Conference. 
The Conference of Tehran, Iran, was to be the first meeting of the Big Three, the leaders of 
Allied superpowers Great Britain, Russia and the United States. In Paul’s opinion, Tehran was 
also to seal Poland’s fate. At the end of 1943, Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin had reached an 
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‘agreement in principle’ on Polish post war borders. Mikolajczyk was supposed not to play a 
role on the conference table. Indeed, the new Polish Prime Minister learned the truth of this 
agreement in October 1944. In Paul’s opinion, then, Roosevelt and Churchill had deliberately 
deceived the London Poles and used them as something to be bargained with.93 
It might be true that the London Poles were unaware of the results of the conference. They 
did, however, hope for a discussion on the ‘Polish Question’ in the first meeting of the three 
war time leaders. The Polish Ambassador in Washington, for example, mentioned to Hull and 
Roosevelt that the government-in-exile was prepared to resume relations with Stalin and that 
the Soviet leader should be appealed in doing so. The London Poles also wanted Stalin’s 
approval for a save return to Poland should the Red Army ‘liberate’ it. Should the Soviet 
Union discard Poland’s wishes, the London Poles were forced to regard the Red Army’s 
entrance into Poland as an invasion. In that situation, the Polish underground ‘Home Army’ 
was not to join Soviet armies. Instead, it would be fighting against them. Giving up Poland’s 
‘eastern territories to the Soviet Union even if it got as compensation East Prussia, Danzig, 
Oppeln and Silesia’ was not an option. This memorandum was sent to the White House on 
November, 19th, 1943, one month before Tehran started.94 According to Eden and the British 
Foreign Office, Poland had little choice. In the British opinion, the resurrection of the Curzon 
Line of 1919 was the only real solution available. On November, 22nd, 1943, Mikolajczyk 
visits the British Foreign Secretary and hopes to press home his views. According to Eden’s 
memoirs, the Polish Prime Minister knew his hand was empty. The London Poles lacked real 
authority in this difficult affair. Russia and the Polish homeland were far away from London, 
making correspondence and controlling the nation difficult. Also, after the Katyn crisis, Stalin 
had installed his own Polish government. This made matters even more difficult for both the 
London Poles and its Western allies. On that evening in 1943, Milajczyk asked his Anglo-
American allies for help. The British Foreign Secretary, on his part, desired to support the 
London Poles in any he could. In fact, he told Mikolajczyk he was already planning to raise 
Polish issues during the upcoming Tehran Conference. ‘There might be some difficulty with 
the Americans, who seemed disposed to put off discussing territorial questions till the end of 
the war’, Eden added in his remark. Success could therefore not be guaranteed, yet Eden 
sounded hopeful. American views in solving the ‘Polish Question’, the postponement of any 
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discussion in this matter until the war had ended, he believed unwise.95 Mikolajczyk’s account 
of this evening, however, was different: 
I saw Eden shortly before he left, and for the first time (to my surprise) he brought up 
the question of Poland’s postwar eastern frontier. There was scant possibility that 
Russia would anew relations with the Polish government, Eden said, unless we agreed 
to give the Reds that huge portion of Poland which the Red Army had invaded in 1939 
as an ally of Hitler. I was familiar, of course, with the guarded, semi-official demands 
that had been coming out of Moscow for the previous year concerning the territory of 
post war Poland. At the same time, I was flabbergasted to hear Eden echoing those 
thoughts as if they were routine, not contemptible. (…). If we give up this territory, 
which, actually, we are not empowered to yield, it will only be the beginning of Polish 
demands.96 
While Eden said he sided with the Poles and did, in short, whatever he was able to do for their 
cause, Mikolajczyk was baffled. He believed Eden was, to a certain extent, siding with Soviet 
Russia! Great Britain was giving away Polish territory and so met Stalin’s demands. 
Mikolajczyk’s blunt language to Eden puts one to the heart of the matter. The two biggest 
Western nations of the United Nations and creators of the Atlantic Charter seemed to have 
chosen for Stalin, and realpolitik, instead of meeting Polish frontier demands. This was not 
what the London Poles wanted to see happening at the first conference between the Big 
Three. 
Tehran, however, was not a conference at which frontier questions would receive the upmost 
of attention. It was mainly a military conference, dedicated to hastening the end of the war. 
The date for the British-American invasion of Normandy was to be decided here. This mainly 
Soviet demand was, in Birse’s words, ‘nothing new’ as it was ‘monotonously repeated’ in ‘a 
well-worn theme.’ Operation Overlord was meant to divert sixty German divisions from the 
Soviet front and therefore required both careful military planning as well as good relations 
with the Russians. Not only was Tehran to set a date for ‘D-Day’, it was also to announce the 
agreement of a United Nations post war organization, increased co-operation between the Big 
Three and Stalin’s informal assurance to the Americans of joining the war against Japan after 
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Germany’s defeat. Birse, the British interpreter in Tehran, argued afterwards that there was 
even more in this conference. It was, in his words, the Soviet Union’s application for 
membership of the club. Throughout the conference, the Soviet Union seemed to be the 
stronger participant and Stalin openly desired equal partnership with Roosevelt and Churchill 
in the settlement of European affairs.97 In Paul’s opinion, the little bargaining power Great 
Britain and the United States had is easily explained. During 1943, Stalin had won important 
victories at Stalingrad and Kursk and was ‘liberating’ Eastern Europe at lightning speed. In 
November, 1943, as we have seen, Russian forces had already re-conquered the Katyn forest 
and were closing in on Poland’s borders. In the meanwhile, the Allies were also successful in 
their military campaign. The Allied forces in Northern Africa had just defeated Rommel and 
his Deutsches Afrikakorps. The campaign was long, however, and the Russians did not 
consider the upcoming Italian campaign as a real second front. In this light of little bargaining 
power, it should be understood from Paul that Churchill and Roosevelt wanted to make ‘major 
concessions’ in the ‘Polish Question’. Russian aid in Operation Overlord, both in planning 
and execution, were crucial in the Allied war plans. This situation could potentially reshape 
the ‘Polish Question’ from the threat it was for several months into a way to please the 
Soviets and secure their assistance in defeating Germany. Churchill was aware of this. In his 
words, ‘the security of the Soviet Union’s western frontier was of paramount importance.’98  
As seen before, the Anglo-American politicians were to choose between the lesser of two 
evils. Were they to protect Poland or to let it fall and support Stalin instead? In Tehran, it 
seemed that both Britain and the United States had made up their minds. The upcoming 
invasion in Normandy, their little bargaining power, the dangers of bringing the Katyn truth in 
the open, it all led to the decision to cast Poland’s wishes and self-determination aside and opt 
for the war effort. One piece of the game, Poland, was omitted from play to achieve the 
greater good of victory. When the conference was over and newspapers and radios reported 
the Big Three’s decisions, Mikolajczyk was therefore baffled once again: 
In London we restlessly awaited the outcome of a meeting that was to mean so 
much to our country. The official announcement, when it came on December 6, 
1943, was astoundingly vague and brief. It took up the military question of 
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pressing the war to a conclusion, but there was no mention of what decisions 
had been taken concerning Poland, if any.99 
The futures of both Germany and Poland were indeed discussed at Tehran, albeit briefly. 
While Germany’s future was to be investigated by the newly found European Advisory 
Commission later on, Stalin was deciding what to do with the Poles. In his opinion, Poland 
was an important part of Russia’s ‘sphere of influence.’ The Soviet leader wanted to see four 
things at Tehran. First, future aggression against the Soviet Union, mainly from Germany, had 
to be prevented in whatever way possible. Allied supervision over German strategic points 
was, in this regard, a viable option. Second, Britain and the United States were to recognize 
Soviet incorporation of the Baltic States in the U.S.S.R. and the Polish-Soviet border of 1939 
should be restored. Third, the Soviet leader wanted to see whole-season operative Baltic ports 
and a corresponding part of East Prussian territory in order to achieve that goal. Fourth, if 
Britain was willing to accept Soviet demands on the Baltic, Stalin would be willing to accept 
Churchill’s ideas on the Polish borders. Should that happen, Polish lands east to the Curzon 
would be handed to the Russians, while Poland would be compensated to the Oder River. The 
Big Three, then, would compensate Poland the territory it lost on the East with up to 400 
miles of land towards the West.100 
One can argue that Churchill tried to focus attention on Poland when he made known his 
plans to invade Europe through the center. The British Prime Minister used the metaphor of a 
crocodile in this respect. If Nazi occupied Europe was a crocodile, so Churchill told at the 
conference, the Balkan was to be its ‘soft underbelly.’ Instead of facing the monster head on, 
Churchill was opting for a more indirect approach. Not surprisingly, this plan was rejected in 
Tehran, due to the preparations for Operation Overlord and Russian insistence on an invasion 
in Normandy. According to Paul, any real hope of ‘saving’ Poland was now gone.101 At the 
same time, Roosevelt used the principles of the Atlantic Charter as slogans in order to 
‘uphold’ Poland’s territorial integrity. Although these slogans were used, Roosevelt was 
careful not to obligate himself too much in such matters. Indeed, by the time of the Tehran 
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Conference, the United States had drawn back substantially from its earlier willingness to take 
initiatives on behalf of the Polish government in its dealings with the Kremlin.102 Washington 
was reluctant to act even as an intermediary now, urging Britain to assume that role because 
of its treaty commitments to the Polish state. The British noted, however, how Roosevelt was 
trying to influence Stalin at the cost of British diplomatic efforts: 
His (Roosevelt) manner was pleasing, but I wondered what there was, behind that 
intellectual face. I remembered the New Deal and all that followed, but I knew too 
little of his background to form any opinion of my own. However, as the Conference 
proceeded I came to the conclusion that if he knew how to deal with American 
problems and domestic politics, he knew little of Soviet mentality, or had been badly 
advised. It was not enough, as he evidently thought, to clap Russians on the back and 
say they were good fellows, in order to reach a mutually advantageous agreement with 
them. Something more subtle was required. He was dealing with a semi-Asian power, 
and a communist one into the bargain. Nor did I like his taking sides with Stalin, 
ostensibly as a joke but nevertheless tactlessly, in allusions to British colonialism. 
Nothing was said about Russian colonialism, or for that matter American. I felt he was 
too ready to play into Stalin’s hands.103  
Roosevelt seemed determined to strike a deal with the Soviet leader in regard to the ‘Polish 
Question’ and to win his favor. On December 1st, 1943, the final day of the Conference, the 
American and Russian delegations met each other and discussed topics without the British 
being present. Charles Bohlen, United States diplomat and Soviet expert, minutes this secret 
conversation: 
THE PRESIDENT said he had asked Marshal Stalin to come to see him as he wished 
to discuss a matter briefly and frankly. He said it referred to internal American 
politics. 
He said that we had an election in 1944 and that while personally he did not wish to 
run again, if the war was still in progress, he might have to. 
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He added that there were in the United States from six to seven million Americans of 
Polish extraction, and as a practical man, he did not wish to lose their vote. He said 
personally he agreed with the views of Marshal Stalin as to the necessity of the 
restoration of a Polish state but would like to see the Eastern border moved further to 
the west and the Western border moved even to the River Oder. He hoped, however, 
that the Marshal would understand that for political reasons outlined above, he could 
not participate in any decision here in Tehran or even next winter on this subject and 
that he could not publicly take part in any such arrangement at the present time. 
MARSHAL STALIN replied that now the President explained, he had understood. 
THE PRESIDENT went on to say that there were a number of persons of Lithuanian, 
Latvian, and Estonian origin, in that order, in the United States. He said that he fully 
realized the three Baltic Republics had in history and again more recently been a part 
of Russia and added jokingly that when the Soviet armies re-occupied these areas, he 
did not intend to go to war with the Soviet Union on this point. 
He went on to say that the big issue in the United States, insofar as public opinion 
went, would be the question of referendum and the right of self-determination. He said 
he thought that world opinion would want some expression of the will of the people, 
perhaps not immediately after their re-occupation by Soviet forces, but some day, and 
that he personally was confident that the people would vote to join the Soviet Union. 
MARSHAL STALIN replied that the three Baltic Republics had no autonomy under 
the last Czar who had been an ally of Great Britain and the United States, but that no 
one had raised the question of public opinion, and he did not quite see why it was 
being raised now. 
THE PRESIDENT replied that the truth of the matter was that the public neither knew 
nor understood. 
MARSHAL STALIN answered that they should be informed and some propaganda 
work should be done.104 
On that secret meeting, Roosevelt told the Soviet leaders he could not officially support the re-
establishment of the Curzon Line. Presidential elections were coming and Roosevelt was 
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going to need the Polish-American vote. Accepting a Polish partition could lead to great 
electoral problems for Roosevelt and the end of his plans to establish a new international 
world order. In telling Stalin, however, that he had no problem with the general idea of 
shifting Polish frontiers to the west, Roosevelt had paved the way for potential 
misunderstanding. According to his own later interpretation, FDR did not have the intention 
to immediately accept the Curzon Line in the East due to the upcoming elections. Yet, Stalin 
and Molotov both understood Roosevelt to be committed in their plans of re-establishing the 
Curzon Line. One might think this was a tactic of telling the Soviet leaders what they wanted 
to hear, yet the real motivation remains ever unclear. It left Eden, after he found out of the 
secret meeting, embittered: 
If we could get on to the business soon we might be able to hammer something out. A 
difficulty is that Americans are terrified of the subject which Harry [Hopkins] called 
‘political dynamite’ for their elections. But, as I told him, if we can not get a solution, 
Polish-Russian relations six months from now, with Russian armies in Poland, will be 
infinitely worse and the elections much nearer. (…). President Roosevelt was reserved 
about Poland to the point of being unhelpful. He mentioned his political difficulties to 
us, but it was not until long afterwards that I learned he had also explained them to 
Stalin. He told the Marshal that for electoral reasons he could not take part in any 
discussion of Poland for another year, nor be publicly associated with any 
arrangement. This was hardly calculated to restrain the Russians. (…). My feelings at 
the close of the Conference were less easy than they had been in Moscow. I found the 
sudden shifts in Stalin’s policies disturbing and could not fathom the apparent 
American unwillingness to make ready with us for the Conference in advance. Above 
all, I began to fear greatly for the Poles.105 
American officials, it seems, privately appeared to have come to the conclusion that the 
United States could do little for Poland expect exhort the Soviets not to be too hard on the 
Poles. As John Gaddis pointed out, the United States would not ‘fight for self-determination 
in Eastern Europe. The one question still unsettled was how to present this policy in the 
United States as anything other than a violation of the Atlantic Charter.’ Washington never 
did find the answer to this problem.106 Indeed, Roosevelt seemed jubilant to American 
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journalists when he returned from Tehran. The President believed the meeting had ‘lived up to 
his highest expectations’ and he was engaged in ‘many excellent talks’. When a journalist 
asked Roosevelt to describe Stalin, the President responded called him ‘something like me – 
he is a realist.’107 
The London Poles were furious after they found out nothing had been decided on Poland’s 
future. When Eden returned from Tehran, Mikolajczyk and the British Foreign Secretary met 
each other and had a fight of arguments. On December, 20th, 1943, the Polish Prime Minister 
plainly states his dissatisfaction to the British efforts in Tehran. Eden was furious: 
Molotov told me, ‘I want to see a strong, independent Poland, but I can not collaborate 
with the Polish government, because it has no good will’- Eden quoted. And then on 
his own he added, ‘And since you had bound my hands by refusing to discuss 
frontiers, I could do nothing more.’108 
Indeed, Churchill sent Eden to the Polish Prime Minister that day to make them accept their 
solution to the ‘Polish Question.’ Whether the Poles liked it or not, they had to give up half 
their country and reorganize their government before they were able to reopen diplomatic 
relations to the Soviets. Eden was instructed to put the matter to the Poles so that they were to 
believe that ‘by taking over and holding firmly the present German territories up to the Oder, 
they will be rendering a service to Europe as a whole by making the basis of a friendly policy 
towards Russia and close association with Czecho-Slovakia.’109 Eden tried to convince the 
Polish Prime Minister of the importance of his decision, yet to no avail: 
‘I share the Prime Minister’s [Churchill’s] view that Stalin will not try to 
annihilate Poland or incorporate it into the Soviet Union,’ Eden said. ‘But it is 
obvious that Stalin’s demands center around the establishment of the Curzon 
line as the future boundary between his country and Poland. Naturally, we 
agreed to nothing in this respect. We were not empowered to do so either by 
the British government or by your own.’ I [Mikolajczyk] replied that no one 
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was empowered arbitrarily to seize or yield half an Allied country. ‘Stalin is 
ready to make compensation to you in East Prussia and Opole Silesia and 
establish the western frontier of Poland and the Oder line. The Prime Minister 
believes that if you would agree to this, there would be a good chance of an 
agreement with Russia, one that would make Poland independent and stronger 
than before the war.’110 
Poland’s leader felt betrayed by British behavior. How could they so easily give away such 
vast parts of land to an unreliable dictator? Moscow and Tehran had not solved the ‘Polish 
Question’ in Polish favor. Instead, the Poles believed these two conferences had made matters 
worse for them. 
The London Poles were not the only one who were critical to what happened in these 
conferences. Some important British-Americans, such as United States Undersecretary of 
State Cordell Hull, did not try to restrain themselves in their opinion on Moscow and Tehran. 
In such a way they became the first of many critics, historians included, on these topics: 
As I see it, the critics of the agreements reached at Tehran, Yalta and Potsdam are 
confusing cause and effect. The agreement so bitterly assailed would have been far 
different had the President decided in 1942 to insist upon the creation of a United 
Nations council charged with the duty of finding solutions for political and territorial 
problems before the end of the war. His refusal to do so was in accord with the advice 
given him by his Secretary of State, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and by most of his White 
House advisors, as well as with the views then held by the Prime Minister of Great 
Britain. It was a decision dictated by the President’s conviction that as Commander-in-
Chief his paramount obligation was to permit nothing to jeopardize the winning of the 
war. Yet with the advantage that hindsight gives us, it seems fair to say that it was this 
decision that was largely responsible for the division of the world today into two 
increasingly warring camps.111 
The matter is more delicate than this, however. As Ostrovsky correctly notes, one must be 
aware of the continuous changes which occur and reshape or redefine foreign policy. Foreign 
policy, in his words, is not a tangible concept that adheres to a standardized form of conduct 
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but instead it is an amorphous force that has the ability to change the face of a nation or 
dictate the future of another.112 Great Britain and the United States of America possibly knew 
what had happened in Katyn. They knew who Stalin was and what he had done in the 1930s. 
In fact, Stalin remarked at the Tehran conference that every German war criminal was to be 
shot. Roosevelt and Churchill knew he was not joking. Yet, the Western leaders had to choose 
their move and they choose to trust the Soviet leader. In fact, they had no other choice. The 
bargaining power of both allies was weak and Russia’s help in Operation Overlord was 
desperately needed. All the same, Eden and Hull were divided in how to cope with Stalin and 
his demands for the Polish frontiers. While Eden and Churchill hoped to solve the matter as 
soon as possible, due to both their sympathies for Poland and political considerations, 
Roosevelt wanted to ensure Russia’s help in the post war world and choose to put such 
delicate questions on hold. Upcoming presidential elections and the role of the Polish-
Americans therein also complicated matters. To Mikolajczyk and his London Poles, however, 
the exact argumentation did not matter anymore. They did not expect these treacherous moves 
from their closest allies and thought both Britain and the United States were selling out the 
Polish state.113 
Chapter 4: Black makes his move, January – October 1944. 
 
The President will do nothing for the Poles, any more than Mr. Hull did at Moscow 
or the President himself did at Tehran.114 
Anthony Eden after Mikolajczyk visited the White House in July, 1944. 
 
It was hardly wise to postpone the effect to solve so extremely delicate a question as 
the Polish frontiers, for example, until the armies of triumphant Russia had actually 
occupied the territories involved or to put off creating an international agency, 
which would have simplified the solution of such questions, until the various 
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governments concerned had taken stands that made any joint solution highly 
doubtful.115 
Sumner Welles in his book The Time For Decision, written in 1944. 
 
On January 11th, 1944, the inevitable had happened. The Red Army crossed the Polish-Soviet 
borders from the Treaty of Riga, settled in 1921. The Soviet Union had entered Polish 
territory once again. Little but a month after the historic conference of Tehran, the Allied 
leaders of the West now had to make haste with their decision regarding Poland’s future. This 
dilemma, however, came at an unfortunate time for the United Nations. The United States 
were advancing swiftly on the Pacific front, Italy was near surrender and the invasion of 
Normandy was at hand. As Reynolds put it, ‘only from 1944 did the America and Britain join 
the Soviet Union as an equal partner in the war against Hitler’s Fortress Europe.’116 The 
historian chose his words deliberately. Before 1944, Britain, the United States and the Soviet 
Union had to go to great lengths to achieve close co-operation with each other. From now on, 
however, the three Allied leaders were for the first time really united in their military 
operations and mutual communication. Due to the agreements in the Moscow and Tehran 
Conferences, a proper Alliance was now in effect. It was only a matter of time before 
Germany would be defeated by the combined strength of the Big Three.117 Important 
questions, however, were not yet solved. Was Stalin going to co-operate when the war was 
over? What was he to do in Eastern Europe, with the territories he claimed to be righteously 
Russian? Tehran and Moscow did not provide clear cut answers, whilst the Soviet war 
machine raged on. This uncertainty led to increasing debate within the American and British 
governments and much more resentment from those who claimed that the Polish-Soviet affair 
had not been dealt with properly. 
 
4.1 The powerless White player, January – July 1944. 
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As seen in the last chapter, American Secretary of State Cordell Hull was reluctant to raise the 
‘Polish Question’ during the Tehran and Moscow Conferences. Roosevelt tried to please 
Stalin with an unofficial, albeit restricted fiat to the Soviet leader’s ideas on what to do with 
Poland’s frontiers. Due to the Polish-American community and the upcoming presidential 
elections, Roosevelt was unable to give Stalin what he wanted. By saying, however, he agreed 
with the Russian arguments, he hoped Stalin would understand the United States was not 
being hostile to him. It seemed, then, that the United States Government had made up its 
mind: the Soviet Union was to remain in the United Nations Alliance at all costs. The reasons 
for choosing this diplomatic strategy were obvious, according to Mark. Between the Moscow 
Conference and the late summer of 1944, Soviet-American relations looked promising. Stalin 
was, for example, grateful for American Lend Lease and he met with Roosevelt, signaling a 
more open Soviet foreign policy. He had also endorsed American economic principles at 
Moscow, and signed a pact of mutual assistance with Czecho-Slovakia which gave the 
Soviets control of Czech foreign policy and military affairs, but left their internal politics 
untouched.118 Perhaps, some of Roosevelt’s administration believed, Stalin was willing to co-
operate with the United States after the war in an effort to protect the world from future harm. 
Not everybody, however, agreed to this. The assistant of the United States Ambassador in 
Moscow, George Kennan, was very critical to American reasoning: 
If we insist at this moment in our history in wandering about with our heads in the 
clouds of Wilsonian idealism and universalistic conceptions of world collaboration, if 
we continue to blind ourselves to the fact that momentary peaceful intentions of the 
mass of inhabitants of Asia and eastern Europe are only the products of their misery 
and weakness and never the products of their strength. If we insist on staking the 
whole future of Europe on the assumption of a community of aims with Russia for 
which there is no real evidence except in our own wishful thinking, then we run the 
risk of losing even that bare minimum of security which would be assured to us by the 
maintenance of humane, stable and co-operative forms of human society on the 
immediate European shores of the Atlantic.119 
After the Tehran Conference, the United States Government had not changed its view. It was 
still reluctant to commit itself in the Polish-Soviet border disputes. This was a major contrast 
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to Roosevelt’s efforts directly after Katyn, when he tried to bring the two governments closer 
together. The risk of alienating Stalin was simply too great and Roosevelt was aware his 
government could not do much against Soviet claims in Eastern Poland.120 
The British, on the other hand, tried whatever they could to break Polish resolve in the matter. 
As seen above, Mikolajczyk and his London Poles felt betrayed and left alone. To them, their 
allies seemed to have abandoned them and were now pressing them to accept Soviet demands. 
The matter, however, is more delicate than this. One might argue that British politicians were 
aware of the Russian threat for Poland and they were doing everything they could to save 
them. On January 30th, 1944, Churchill made a secret request to the British Ambassador to the 
London Poles. The man, who had told the British Government of Soviet guilt in the Katyn 
atrocities more than six months before, was being asked by the Prime Minister to re-
investigate the matter. Churchill timed his request well. In the first days of January, 1944, the 
Soviet Union publicized their version of what had happened in Katyn. This Burdenko report 
was a lot different from what the Germans had claimed in April, 1943. Forensic investigation, 
so says the report, had showed that the Polish officers were not murdered in 1940, when the 
Soviets occupied the territory, but in 1941. Also, recovered German bullets and Polish diaries 
seemed to prove the point that it was Nazi Germany, not Soviet Russia, which had committed 
the crime.121 Faithfully, O’Malley set out to work once again, questioning whether or not the 
Burdenko report was right. On February 11th, 1944, his second dispatch was finished and 
secretly distributed among the top of the British Government. O’Malley’s conclusions had not 
changed from six months before. The Soviet Union was, in his opinion, still guilty of the 
crimes in Katyn.  
Coincidentally, or not, the British were in heavy argument with the London Poles, while 
O’Malley was researching his second dispatch. The Poles were still angry because the ‘Polish 
Question’ had not been discussed at Tehran. Also, they had learned of Soviet propaganda 
claiming a Russian-supported Polish government in Warsaw. To them, it was enough proof of 
Stalin’s intentions. At those meetings in February, 1944, O’Malley was present. On February 
6th, 1944, John Colville, Churchill’s secretary and writer of the Downing Street Diaries, noted 
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that O’Malley stayed to dine with Churchill and told Colville the Balkan and East European 
countries still felt Germany being their only hope of protection against the Russian menace.122 
Indeed, Mikolajczyk felt he had to reject ‘dictatorial demands.’ The British Prime Minister 
was furious: 
Churchill: You know there will be no restoration of Polish-Soviet 
 relations unless you consent to Russia’s territorial demands! 
Mikolajczyk: I am not empowered to give away half of my country.123 
Matters got worse on February 22nd, 1944. That day, Churchill explained to the House of 
Commons on how Polish borders were to be changed. It infuriated the Poles even more.  
The fate of the Polish nation ranks first in thought and politics of government and the 
British Parliament. I was glad to hear from the mouth of Marshal Stalin that he too is 
determined to build and maintain a strong Poland, independent and united, as one of 
the leading powers of Europe. We have never guaranteed any specific Polish 
borders. We have not given our consent to the occupation of Wilno by the Poles in 
1920; the British view, against this, found sound expression in 1919 in what is called 
the ‘Curzon Line.’ I feel a deep sympathy to the Poles, but I also 
understand the Russian point of view. The liberation of Poland shall have to be 
accomplished by Soviet armies who, after suffering losses amounting to millions of 
men fallen in battle, have come to break the German military power. I do not feel that 
Russian, related with the security of its Western frontiers, exceed the limits of what is 
reasonable and just. Marshal Stalin and I agree on the need to compensate Poland at 
the expense of Germany, as well as in the North and the West.124 
Churchill’s speech was to demonstrate yet again the difficulty of finding an answer in the 
‘Polish Question.’ On the one hand, Stalin was not pleased with the unfolding developments. 
The Russian sent Churchill an infuriated message, claiming the Prime Minister ‘had 
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committed an act of injustice and unfriendliness towards the Soviet Union.’125 Stalin believed 
both Churchill and Roosevelt had both consented themselves with Russian plans to Poland 
and now Churchill seemed to back down. Churchill was now to choose once more whether or 
not he was going to follow the principles of the Atlantic Charter, which could be found in his 
speech, or to denounce them altogether by publicly announcing a solution to the ‘Polish 
Question.’126 On the other hand, the London Poles were angered even more than they had 
already been earlier that month. Not only that, General Anders’ Polish divisions from Iran, at 
the time engaged in the Italian campaign, issued the following declaration on February 25th: 
The soldiers of the Polish army in the Middle East do not accept the idea that an inch 
of Polish territory should be ceded to the Bolsheviks. We are going to fight against the 
Germans, without sparing any sacrifices, but we also consider the Bolsheviks as our 
enemies. If they turned out to be victorious in Europe, no guarantee for their purposes 
can be given to us. Poland shall cease to exist for a long period of time and the Polish 
nation would be destroyed.127 
In February 1944, then, British politicians tried whatever they could in regard to Poland’s 
future. Finding an answer, however, which was to please both the Polish government-in-exile 
and the Soviet Union was most difficult. Stalin wanted to make sure the informal agreements 
at Tehran were kept alive, while the Poles did not want to know of any such thing. Therefore, 
Churchill and Eden tried to batter Mikolajczyk into submission and raising political pressure 
on him. British opinion on the Soviet Union’s reliability was also shaken and became more 
uncertain, due to O’Malley’s second dispatch in this period. It led Anthony Eden to exclaim 
that ‘the evidence [of the Burdenko Commission] is conflicting [with O’Malley’s findings] 
and whatever we may suspect, we shall probably never know.’128 
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Throughout 1944, Great Britain and the United States were walking a tightrope of holding the 
Soviet Union within the Alliance and keeping Polish anger at bay. At times, this proved 
difficult for the Anglo-American leaders. Churchill, on the one hand, was sometimes furious 
at Stalin as he could not cope with the Russian’s demands. At a garden party on March, 26th, 
Churchill thundered his thoughts on Stalin for fifteen minutes against Harriman, claiming 
Britain had done whatever it could for both Russia and Poland but being scoffed at from the 
very beginning in 1941. Even Colville claimed in the Downing Street Diaries at that time it 
seemed ‘our efforts to promote a Russo-Polish understanding have failed.’129 Roosevelt, on 
the other hand, had to face a potential crisis with the Polish-American community in March 
1944. Discussions engulfed the country whether or not Lange and Orlemanski, two important 
leaders of the Polish Left, and staunch communist supporters, were allowed to visit the Soviet 
Union. Eventually, Roosevelt gave his permission but with noticing American irresponsibility 
for the behavior of the two Poles.130  
 
4.2   Black strikes: the Warsaw Uprising. 
August, 1st, 1944, was to be the start of the climax for British and American handling with the 
Polish-Soviet disputes. On that date, the Polish underground ‘Home Army’ started an uprising 
against its German aggressor. The plans for an uprising, to be initiated when a ‘liberating’ 
army was nearing the Polish capital, were effective at the start and the insurgents speedily 
controlled the city’s communication and transport networks. From that moment on, the 
waiting for Soviet troops to enter the capital and to give the Germans the final blow had 
begun. No Red Army was to liberate Warsaw, however. Instead, Russian tanks stopped their 
advance and entered the city only months later. By that time, over 200,000 Poles had lost their 
lives and the capital was almost completely destroyed. The Red Army eventually liberated 
Warsaw on January, 17th, 1945. Colville described the Uprising as ‘a grim problem. They are 
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fighting desperately against fearful odds.’ From August, 1944, Mikolajczyk, Churchill and 
Roosevelt were to deal immediately with a stubborn Stalin and to convince him to come to 
Warsaw’s aid. Yet, as Colville noted on August 24th: 
The Russians are deaf to all pleas and determined to wash their hands of it all. 
[Possible] Explanations:  1) (…) they were seriously checked at the 
    gates of Warsaw. 
   2) (…) a curious pride which makes them 
    determined that other powers shall not do 
    what they can not do. 
   3) (…) finding that the population of  
    Warsaw and the underground movement 
    are behind the Polish Government in 
    London and do not support the puppet 
    Moscow Polish National Liberation  
    Committee.131 
The Warsaw Uprising brought the matter of the Lublin Committee to the fore and was to test 
the United Nations and their mutual commitment to their utmost of lengths. 
On July 22nd, 1944, the Red Army ‘liberated’ the Polish city of Lublin. It was the first major 
city in Poland brought under Soviet control, making it an ideal place of installing the Polish 
rival government Stalin was beginning to support after he denounced the London Poles in 
April, 1943. This Lublin Committee became Russia’s version of Poland’s government and 
was effectively the key to a military dictatorship from the Red Army. Reconciliation between 
Mikolajczyk’s government in London and Stalin was now further away than ever. This was 
proved on August 3rd, when the Polish Prime Minister urged Stalin to speak to him on the 
Warsaw Uprising. The Soviet leader basically told him that the real Polish Government was to 
be found in Lublin and that they should be contacted. The Lublin Poles saw Mikolajczyk and 
argued that were was no uprising in Warsaw, the Curzon Line was to be the Polish-Soviet 
demarcation line and that the London Poles were to receive four out of nineteen positions 
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within the new government. There was nothing the Prime Minister could do to break Russian 
resolve.132 
The nations who were alleged to have betrayed Poland now seemed to come to its rescue. 
Allied fighter and bomber squads focusing on German industry, were now being instructed to 
supply the besieged capital. Stalin, however, closed his airports, making it impossible for the 
Allied airplanes to refuel and resupply. As an effect, the Warsaw Uprising and Russia’s 
behavior sparked an intense discussion within the American and British governments and 
their policy towards the Soviet Union. Cordell Hull, for example, the man who was reluctant 
to deal with the ‘Polish Question’ at Tehran, now told Roosevelt on August 16th that the 
Anglo-Americans could not abandon Poland at this point and leave it to its fate, whether the 
Russians liked it or not.133 Eden was doubtful when Churchill journeyed to Moscow to speak 
with Stalin on this matter in person: 
I was not hopeful for the outcome of our mission. The Russians had already grabbed 
the territory they wanted, so that the Curzon Line was no longer the real issue. It was 
what happened in Poland that mattered. While we would agree that an early union 
between the Government in London and the National Committee in Lublin was 
desirable, I was unhappily conscious that the Soviet Government had every motive to 
play for time. The longer their puppets had to extend their rule and destroy the official 
underground movement, the worse for free Poland. (…). Our best chance was to 
protest the damage to Anglo-Soviet relations which must result from failure to agree a 
fair settlement for the Poles, but this was an uncertain weapon.134 
Bohlen and Kennan, furthermore, discussed the matter between them and they were bitterly 
divided. Bohlen, on the one hand, accepted Roosevelt’s reasoning. He thought drastic military 
intervention from the United States was not going to change things in Warsaw and would 
have serious repercussions in diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. This would perhaps 
mean the loss of the eastern frontier against Germany, no Russian assistance on the Pacific 
front and creating a post war organization a lot more difficult. Kennan argued that all military 
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assistance possible should be given to the Poles and supplies to the Russians should be 
stopped.135 Finally, Harriman believed that this all was a plan from Stalin to get rid from 
potential enemies. ‘These [Poles in Warsaw]’, so Harriman notes, ‘were the Poles loyal to the 
London government-in-exile, who stood in the way of his Lublin Committee.’ Indeed, he 
notes to Roosevelt that Stalin based his politics on ‘ruthless political considerations.’136 
On August 29th, 1944, Great Britain and the United States accepted the underground ‘Home 
Army’ in Warsaw as an official fighting army for the United Nations. This effectively meant 
it now was to be regarded as an army to be fought with under international rules, such as the 
rules of engagement or treaties concerning prisoners of war. Carr argues that this was a bold 
diplomatic move from the two nations, meant to anger the Soviet Union and to escape albeit 
slightly from her will. Yet, they had come too late. Talks between Churchill and Stalin were 
fruitless and the United States did not find a solution to the ‘Polish Question.’ While Britain 
was united against the Soviet Union and the way they dealt with Warsaw, Churchill was 
reluctant to make the final move of stopping every convoy to Russia. Eden and the Prime 
Minister discussed ‘gate-crashing’ the Soviet airfields, forcing the Soviets to choose sides 
when British airplanes wanted to land on Russian soil. In the United States meanwhile, 
Hopkins, Roosevelt’s trusted advisor, was determined to keep the White House out of the 
affair as much as he could. He withheld cablegrams from Churchill to the president out of a 
belief that the British were using the United States as a tool for their own sake. In the end, one 
can argue, the Warsaw Uprising had not fundamentally changed British and American’s 
dealings with Stalin. Britain tried to do whatever it could, but it had to have the support of the 
Americans. The White House looks to have been in doubt, with some choosing sides for the 
Poles and others clearly opting for the longer run with the Soviets. Mark goes as far as 
claiming that Washington saw Warsaw as part of a long-feared Anglo-Soviet struggle for 
power, each claiming certain parts of Europe in a relentless quest for spheres of influence? 
Had Britain not imposed a government of its own in Greece?137 
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Conclusion: checkmate? 
In the introduction of this Master-Thesis, I argued that not everything could be covered. 
British and American diplomacy during World War II is a vast subject, even when one tries to 
focus specifically on Poland. Also, Poland is the bearer of a very difficult history, being 
disputed for so many years. We started this Thesis with explaining the ‘Polish Question’ and 
its difficulties, to lend historical truth to that aspect. Afterwards, we set out on a 
reconstruction of events and opinions. It seemed as if historiography, as described in three 
different schools in the Introduction, on British and American handling with the Poles was 
flawed and haunted with hindsight,  how well researched and cleverly constructed as it may 
be. Historians of the schools of innocence and blame tended to argue that Churchill and 
Roosevelt consciously did not respond to Soviet threats. These authors, who were mainly 
Poles, carry the scars of the past. They know from hindsight that the Soviet Union was guilty 
of the crimes in Katyn. They also know that over 200,000 people died in the Warsaw Uprising 
and they know Poland was to deal with a Soviet conqueror well until the 1980s. They 
condemned the Americans and British for their lack of proper efforts to save Poland and 
consequently called them traitors.  
Personally, I opt for the third school of reconstruction. Although it is understandable why 
historians tend to think in such an emotional way, they should not forget what really happened 
in the historical context of the 1940s. In 1939, the Western image of Stalin and the Soviet 
Union was that of a barbarian from the east, who was willing to strike deals with other 
dictators to conquer Europe. From 1941 onwards, however, this image rapidly changed. 
Russia was becoming the most important country for the Allied war effort. Victories at Kursk 
and Stalingrad ensured that Stalin and his Red Army were to be seen as the Allied David 
fighting off the Nazi Goliath against all odds. When Goebbels announced the discoveries at 
Katyn in April, 1943, and Russia ended its diplomacy with Poland, the immediate reaction of 
Churchill and Roosevelt was to bring the two nations back together. It was all German 
propaganda, in their opinion. To the President and the Prime Minister, it seemed as if the most 
powerful member of the Grand Alliance was trying to abandon them. When O’Malley 
revealed the truth in May, 1943, the British Government realized their response was morally 
wrong, yet the war effort was to be put on top of everything else. They had no other choice. 
His Majesty’s Government could risk everything, most importantly the credibility of the 
Atlantic Charter, by telling what had really happened in the forests near Smolensk. At 
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approximately the same time, the United States realized that Russia was to become a world 
power after World War II and its advancing armies were to become an important key to 
securing peace in the post war world. This made Roosevelt and some members of his 
administration believe that important questions as frontiers should be settled after the war. 
Not only does this school of reconstruction do justice to the difficulties of diplomacy and its 
effects on the war effort, it also pays a lot of attention to the difficult communication between 
the war time leader. Throughout this Thesis, and throughout the accounts of meetings between 
the likes of Churchill, FDR, Stalin and Mikolajczyk, one can find misunderstandings or 
complete assumptions based on only a few words said by one statesman to the other. 
Notorious examples are the talks between Roosevelt and Stalin on the Curzon Line and the 
mix-ups between Anthony Eden and Mikolajczyk. Not only is diplomacy very difficult, it 
could change identity within a flash. Unknowingly (or knowingly?), diplomats and statesmen 
said things the other side gladly wanted to hear. These assumptions made things even more 
complicated and, in my opinion, are vital in understanding this period of time. 
Also, we have seen that both Great Britain and the United States showed affection for the fate 
of the Polish nation. Instead of consciously deciding to sacrifice their old ally for a new, albeit 
dangerous, one, they came to its rescue in the Warsaw Uprising and they tried to convince the 
Poles earlier on that there really was no other option. Indeed, it was better to accept Russian 
demands and gain a bit of territory in the West instead of potentially losing it all. To many 
historians, however, this point proved how opportunistic the Western leaders were dealing 
with this problem. I do not think that this opinion is fair. In Moscow and Tehran, it seemed 
that Eden and Churchill were willing to solve the question of Poland’s frontiers, while 
Roosevelt and Hull were against that. Eden says that the Poles were not willing to co-operate, 
so limiting the Foreign Secretary’s hand and that there was virtually no bargaining power 
against the Soviet Union at the time. Hull and Roosevelt looked at the bigger picture, claiming 
that other things were far more important. Operation Overlord, Roosevelt’s re-election and the 
potential threat of opening a Pandora’s Box of frontier questions were the matters at hand, 
how unlucky that may be for the Poles. Indeed, the United States eventually decided that 
Poland would a case for the Britons to deal with. Their commitments elsewhere did not allow 
them to come to Poland’s rescue. 
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By using the metaphor of the chess game, I hoped to have shown that the matter is a lot more 
difficult than just being a willing choice from Allied leaders to abandon their Polish friends. 
The context in which the Anglo-American diplomacy of this period takes place is very 
important. I shall name three examples here. First, the history of Poland was very complicated 
and the question of its frontiers could not be solved in only a few days. Its leaders were 
gathered in London, its armies stationed in Iran and Scotland. This made the Polish 
government-in-exile anxious to do something, yet they were not strong enough to intervene 
directly against Stalin. They were simply to far away from their country. Katyn’s aftermath 
made matters even more difficult for the London Poles, since Stalin tried to establish a Polish 
government of his own. Second, Roosevelt and Churchill, though sometimes frustrated with 
the Soviet leadership, could not always be aware of what Stalin was planning or doing all the 
time. When the Germans announced the discoveries at Katyn, at first both Churchill and 
Roosevelt thought to witness another effort of German propaganda and gave their support to 
Stalin. Later on, indeed, the British and the Americans found out their initial response was 
wrong, but it was far too late to back down at that point. Stalin and his Red Army was too 
important for the current war effort against Nazi Germany and might yet play a major role in 
the Pacific theatre against Japan. The Soviet Union, despite all their misgivings, also seemed 
more open than ever. Stalin received Allies in Moscow and went to Tehran in person to meet 
the Allied leaders and make important agreements on the post war organization. There were 
simply far larger issues at stake than just Poland and it was something that had to be carefully 
weighted by Churchill and Roosevelt. Third, not everybody within the Anglo-American 
governments seemed to agree with the outlined policies. We saw many arguments from 
(mainly American) politicians such as Sumner Welles and Ambassador Harriman, claiming 
that their policy was plain wrong. While not immediately leading to a palace revolt, this could 
become something disturbing and one can imagine that it took a long time to deal with these 
various opinions and to keep them from public opinion. 
I hoped to have argued that historiography on this topic should be less colored and be less 
condemning to what happened behind the closed doors of diplomacy. Instead of looking at 
this topic through subjective eyes, as seen in the schools of blame and innocence, one can 
only truly understand the diplomatic events of this time when looking at it from a 
‘reconstructive’ view. The politicians simply could not know what was to happen and it could 
be they were overrun by events. In short, it does not matter whether one was check-mated by 
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the other or not. The game that led to it is what matters and what was the argumentation 
behind taking certain moves. One can carefully think over its move, there is always an option 
it may turn out a lot different than was originally intended. 
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